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ABSTRACT  
 
Many scholars have suggested that South Korea is one of the most successful 
democracies in Asia. Because of the successful development of democracy, it can be 
inferred that citizens should be happy with their political system and the government’s 
policy outputs. However, evidence indicates that ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with 
government and politicians as well as their democratic system. If this evidence is true, why 
are ordinary people distrustful of and dissatisfied with the government, politicians, and their 
democracy? Regarding this concern, two dominant perspectives - policy matters and 
process matters - have increasingly been put into question. Conventional wisdom stresses 
policy as the cause for ordinary people’s dissatisfaction with and distrust of government 
and politicians. On the other hand, some scholars insist that ordinary people’s 
dissatisfaction with and distrust of government and politicians are a reflection of the 
process performance of politicians and government.  
Given the fundamental criteria of the democratic process in South Korea, process 
concerns could explain the variation in people’s perception of government and politicians. 
Additionally, understanding people’s process preferences helps solve several issues, 
including why ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with government and politicians, why they 
want to be directly involved in policy and the policy making process, or why they believe 
the government is not responsive to their interests and wishes. To investigate what people 
would want concerning the democratic process, this dissertation not only theoretically 
examined five different types of processes (i.e., representative, deliberative, direct, pure 
 ii
direct or stealth democracy), but also empirically tested what type of democratic processes 
that ordinary Koreans really prefer. These questions regarding the types of the democratic 
process and factors influencing South Koreans’ preference for type of democracy are the 
case of this dissertation.  
To examine these concerns, a nation-wide survey was conducted in South Korea, 
resulting in a large random sample (n= 599). Empirical findings shed important new 
insights. First, a large majority of ordinary citizens in South Korea are dissatisfied with the 
government, politicians, and their democratic system. Second, most people have a 
preference for a pure direct democracy rather than other types of democratic process such 
as deliberative or representative democratic process. Additionally, a large majority of 
respondents prefer stealth democracy as an alternative democratic process. Finally, South 
Korean government policy, especially the Sunshine Policy, and the policy making process 
toward North Korea and regionalism are the main factors that affect types of the democratic 
process that ordinary Koreans deeply prefer.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Statement of Research Problem 
Some leading scholars define democracy as a form of government opposed to 
monarchies and aristocracies. In terms of fundamental values, democracy can be described 
as upholding the values of political equality, liberty, moral self-development, the common 
interest, a fair moral compromise, binding decisions that take everyone’s interests into 
account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, efficient decisions, and also the use of basic 
freedoms of association, information, and communication (e.g., Dahl 1956, 1989; Held 
1996; Lijphart 1999; Linz 2000).  
Concerning the definition and criteria of democracy, many political scholars have 
insisted that South Korea is one of the most successful third-wave democracies in Asia with 
regard to: 1) formal and peaceful transition from the authoritarianism of past years to 
democracy in 1987; 2) the ability of citizens to choose the head of the executive branch and 
the members of the legislature through regularly scheduled electoral contests; 3) its current 
regime fully meeting the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, universal adult 
suffrage, and multiparty competition; and 4) its current regime which meets other important 
principles of liberal democracy and upholds its basic values such as freedom, equality, and 
justice (Huntington, 1991; Lee, 2002; Shin et al., 2005; Young, 1989).  
Though many scholars have evaluated South Korea as a good example of 
successful transition among the third-wave democracies, it can be argued that the notable 
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development of democracy in South Korea does not mean ordinary people in South Korea 
are satisfied with their democratic system and government (e.g., Im, 2006; Jun and Kim, 
2002; Seo, 2006). The bulk of the evidence supports the argument that ordinary Koreans 
are dissatisfied with the government. For example, in 2000 the Government Information 
Agency (GIA) investigated ordinary people’s attitudes toward the government and 
politicians. The result indicated that 89.5% of people expressed distrust of political parties 
and the National Assembly in South Korea. A major Korean newspaper Han-Kuk Il-bo 
(2005) conducted a nationwide survey investigating individuals’ attitudes toward the 
government, asking “Do you think that the government has worked effectively for domestic 
politics and the economy?” The result showed that 84% of respondents said no (absolutely 
no: 23.6% and relatively no: 60.4%) and only 15.4% of respondents said yes (absolutely 
yes: 0.6% and relatively yes: 14.8%).  
A major newspaper Chosun Il-bo and Korea Gallup (2008) conducted a nationwide 
survey investigating individuals’ attitudes toward the Lee Myung-bak government, asking 
“Are you satisfied that the new government has worked effectively for domestic politics, 
the economy, and relations with North Korea?” The result showed that 64.2% of 
respondents said “not satisfied” and only 17.3% of respondents said “satisfied.” The 
evidence clearly indicates that ordinary people’s dissatisfaction and discontent with the 
government are not a temporary phenomenon in South Korea. Rather, this loss of trust in 
government by the people is longstanding in South Korea. If so, why are ordinary people 
distrustful and dissatisfied with the government? With regard to this question, different 
perspectives exist. 
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Some previous studies investigated the trends and causes of declining political trust 
and satisfaction in the U. S., emphasizing policy and outcome matters (e.g., Lawrence, 
1997; Nye, 1997). Nye (1997: 8) argues that “people may be properly unhappy with poor 
social outcomes even though the quality of government outputs does not change.” 
Regarding the policy matters causing political distrust and dissatisfaction among the people, 
it can be inferred that because ordinary people’s policy preferences and the real policies of 
the government are somewhat different, ordinary people are dissatisfied and discontent with 
government and politicians. However, this concern may have been neither plentiful nor 
conclusive in supporting the common negative perception of ordinary people toward 
government and politicians.  
Some scholars have argued that public dissatisfaction with government and 
politicians is a reflection of the process performance of politicians, governmental 
institutions and elected officials (e.g., Funk, 2001; Gibson and Caldeira, 1995; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 1995, 2001 and 2002; Im, 2006; Tyler, 1990). For example, Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2001: 64) argue, “while outcomes are clearly relevant to public attitudes 
toward government, they leave much unexplained.” Rather, with results from focus groups 
and a national survey in the U. S., they stress that ordinary people dislike and are 
discontented with government due to politicians who are selfish in the process of policy 
making and who give less consideration to ordinary people’s interests.  
If the process is a good predictor influencing ordinary people’s political attitudes 
and behaviors toward government and politicians, what government processes do ordinary 
people want? Which of the alternative models of democracy (i.e., deliberative, participatory, 
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representative, or stealth democracy) would people prefer (e.g., Budge, 1996; Cohen, 1989; 
Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan and Karp, 2006; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002; March and Olsen, 1986; Putnam, 1993; Scarrow, 2001)? People’s 
dissatisfaction with government might be due to their not having enough say in the 
government, in which case they would prefer direct or participatory democracy. Or people 
might want a representative democracy in which representatives make decisions based on 
the people’s wishes or on what they think is in the people’s best interest. Or it might be that 
ordinary people do not like to be involved in the policy-making process, because they 
perceive that politicians tend to be self-serving, dishonest, prone to argue, eager to 
compromise, and conflictual in politics and policy making (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2002). Rather, they would prefer stealth democracy1: people want government that is run by 
non-self-interested decision makers (ENSIDs) so they do not need to pay attention to 
politics. 
Research in the United States suggests that Americans are disturbed by the 
problems of selfishness, debate, conflict, and compromise and therefore prefer stealth 
democracy, but these results might not be applicable to the political institutions or 
environments in different countries that have unique features (e.g., historical, cultural, and 
socioeconomic differences). The U.S. has no key defining political divisions, so support for 
stealth democracy might simply reflect the lack of major cleavages in American society. 
                                            
1 The definition of stealth democracy is that “governmental procedures are not visible to people unless they 
go looking; the people do not routinely play an active role in making decisions, in providing input to decision 
makers, or in monitoring decision makers” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 143). Additionally, “supporters 
of stealth democracy believe: 1) debate is not necessary or helpful; 2) compromise among elected officials is 
not necessary; and 3) decision making should be made by the elites who are non-self-interested decision 
makers (ENSIDs)” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 143). 
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South Korea, in contrast, offers a good alternative case, a case in which politics is affected 
by two major issues: South Korea’s policy process toward North Korea and political 
regionalism. 
With the establishment of two separate states (North and South Korea) on the 
peninsula in 1948, and especially after the Korean War of 1950-53, both states have 
continued to keep their own political structures while perpetuating the continued division. 
Under the circumstances of the division of Korea into North and South, politicians’ debates 
about South Korea’s policy toward North Korea cannot be expected to end overnight. For 
example, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations insisted that South Korea’s 
policy of engagement (i.e., Sunshine Policy) with North Korea enhanced positive 
behavioral change in North Korea. On the other hand, new president Lee Myung-bak and 
his ruling party (Grand National Party (GNP)) have criticized the engagement policy that it 
did not bring any meaningful changes to North Korean politics.  
Additionally, one of the most notable features that may be causing the public’s 
dissatisfaction and discontent with government is regionalism. As Kwon (2004: 547) argues, 
“South Korea’s regionalism has nothing to do with ethnic or religious or other ‘primordial’ 
types of conflicts so that one would consider it much more benign than is regionalism in 
Nigeria or South Africa.” Rather, the form of regionalism in South Korea can serve as a 
mechanism of checks and balances against highly centralized political power between 
progressives and conservatives. In particular, regionalism in South Korea refers to political 
antagonism among regions, primarily manifested as rationalistic voting patterns in which 
voters cast their votes for candidates or parties that have nothing to do with candidates’ 
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political capability or party platforms or others.  
For example, whole regional populations like Kyongsang provinces in southeastern Korea 
are bigger than Cholla provinces in southwestern Korea. Therefore, all the presidents and 
ruling parties, from the early 1960s to late 1990s, came from Kyongsang provinces. 
Because of winning presidential and party elections during that time, the citizens of 
Kyongsang provinces had relative advantages over various economic and political 
beneficiaries under their rule, while Cholla citizens were frustrated about their lack of 
economic development due to biased political and economic developments (Kim, 1987; 
Kim, 1997). Such political features have divided the electorates along geographical lines 
between Kyongsang in the south-east and the Cholla in the south-west as well as 
ideological gaps between progressives and conservatives, and thus regionalism has become 
a barrier to an effective policy making process among politicians.  
These two issues (i.e., South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and regionalism) 
essentially define politics in South Korea and they might well heavily influence South 
Koreans’ dissatisfaction with government and their preferences for an alternative form of 
democracy. Unlike Americans, who do not face these defining issues, South Koreans might 
enjoy the debates and compromises that take place in government because of their 
experiences with the North Korea policy and regionalism. They might even prefer to be 
directly involved in political decision making themselves. On the other hand, South 
Koreans might react to these defining issues by supporting stealth democracy more than 
other types of democracy. Or, to some extent South Korean might prefer to combine two 
different types of democracy such as direct and stealth democracy. 
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Considering democratic process matters (i.e., different types of democratic process) 
and factors specific to South Korea (i.e., South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and 
political regionalism) several questions become relevant: 1) to what extent are ordinary 
people satisfied with government and politicians?; 2) do the people really want to 
participate in the policy making process?; 3) do the people only want to consider and 
discuss political issues and then let politicians decide issues?; 4) do the people want 
politicians to carefully consider and decide all political issues in operating their 
government?; 5) do the people want to have a smaller role in government?; 6) do the people 
really dislike debates, conflict, and the self-interested behavior of politicians in decision 
making due to regionalism?; and 7) do South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and 
regionalism affect people’s answer to these questions?  
Regarding these questions, the main purpose of this dissertation is not so much to 
find a particular solution to the political problems in South Korea, but to provide deeper 
insights as to what types of processes people want if the process is important for 
understanding people’s dissatisfaction and discontent with government and politicians in 
South Korea. This dissertation tests whether or not government processes and these two 
factors are significantly related to each other in South Korea. Additionally, another task in 
this dissertation is to investigate the quality of democratic institutions in South Korea with 
regard to ordinary people’s perception of the political system, their political activities, and 
their attitudes toward the visible performance of the government. Therefore, there are 
several hypotheses that I have to test the questions in this dissertation. 
This dissertation is organized into five chapters, including the introduction chapter. 
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The second chapter reviews earlier evidence concerning the cause and degree of ordinary 
Koreans’ dislike and distrust of government. Are the people really satisfied with their 
democratic system? Additionally, to what extent do ordinary people really care about most 
of the policies? The second chapter also examines what people would want concerning 
government processes by focusing on four different democratic process types (i.e., 
representative, deliberative, participatory, or stealth democracy). To what extent do the two 
factors - South Korean’s policy and policy making process toward North Korea and 
regionalism - relate to different types of democratic process? Additionally, several variables 
(i.e., political system, approval of various parts of the government, and political 
participation and activities) will be discussed to test whether these variables are statistically 
related to the type of democratic process ordinary people prefer. The third chapter briefly 
describes the research design, focusing on research procedures, measurements of each 
variables, and analytical methods for analyzing the data. The fourth chapter addresses the 
data analysis, based on the results of a democratic process survey administered in South 
Korea. The final chapter summarizes the results, and discusses the limitations and 
significance of this study.  
 
2. Summary 
To understand ordinary Koreans’ political attitudes and behaviors toward 
government and politicians most studies have only focused on policy concerns. If the policy 
concerns are only a part of predictor influencing ordinary Koreans’ political attitudes and 
behaviors toward government and politicians, what do the people care about? Regarding 
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this concern, I argue that people care deeply about process because most people believe that 
decision makers are prone to debate, conflict, and compromise and to be self-serving in the 
policy making process, and they are therefore dissatisfied and discontented with 
government and politicians. The ordinary people’s perception by government and 
politicians in policy and policymaking process with political issues, such as policy and 
policy making process toward North Korea and regionalism, will lead to their preference of 
type of democratic process.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. The People’s Political Discontent and Distrust of Government 
As Schattschneider (1960: 138) wrote, “democracy is a competitive political system 
in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in 
such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process.” Some 
theoretical arguments, especially democratic pluralism, assumed that “stable democracies 
are built on a foundation of public attachments to political parties, support for the rules of 
the game, and political tolerance” (Sears and Levy, 2003: 62). As it is, ordinary people have 
relatively low political participation rates and are turned off of government. Moreover, 
ordinary people distrust politicians, government, and administrative policies. As mentioned 
above, considering that declining trust and satisfaction have been crucial problems in 
democratic countries, many scholars have extensively studied the trends and causes of such 
political perceptions and suggested some possible reasons by examining either policy or 
process matters (e.g., Funk, 2001; Gibson and Caldeira, 1995; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2001, 2002; Im, 2006; Lawrence, 1997; Lye, 1997; Tyler, 1990, 2001).  
 
“Evaluations of citizen obligation to obey congressional rules and decisions are 
shaped by procedural evaluations…citizen evalutions of legitimacy and 
obligation are strongly influenced by assessments of the fairness of 
institutional decision making”  (Tyler, 2001: 236). 
 
Empirically survey data indicate that new democracies, e.g., Portugal, Greece, Brazil, 
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Hungary, and so on, often show a syndrome consisting of the mistrust of politics and 
politicians, sentiments of personal political inefficacy, low confidence in democratic 
institutions, and dissatisfaction with the performance of the actual democratic institutions 
(Przeworski et al., 1999: 57). For example, national survey conducted in 1990, found that 
63 percent of Greek citizens stated dissatisfaction with the state of democracy. When 
citizens were asked about trust toward government and politicians in 1991, nearly three out 
of every four citizens in Hungary believed that politicians should never be trusted 
(Przeworski et al., 1999: 57-9). 
In the context of this concern, South Korea is not an exceptional case, even though 
this country is an impressive model of successful democracies in Asia. In general, many 
recent studies focusing on ordinary people’s attitudes toward government, politicians, and 
policies have identified these concerns in South Korea as well. Lee and his colleagues 
(2001) conducted a nationwide survey of 1056 randomly selected adults in 2000 to 
investigate ordinary people’s perceptions of the government and its policies. The survey 
results show that 86.5 percent of respondents said that “I distrust government, policies, and 
even elected officials.” When asked the question, “Do you believe that most officials have 
the capability to work for ordinary people and are they interested in the people of South 
Korea,” 68.8% of respondents said that officials are not capable. 
By examining some institutional issues with a higher level of distrust in 
government, Jun and Kim (2002: 6) argue that “the abuse of political power, the abuse of 
social capital, the lack of accountability, and corruption at the high level are paramount 
examples of the sources of distrust in the Korean society.” According to Jun and Kim 
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(2002: 10-11), major issues related to the people’s distrust and dissatisfaction with politics 
and the administration in South Korea today are: 1) distrust of politicians; 2) distrust of law 
and order; 3) corrupt relations between government and business; 4) lack of confidence in 
presidential leadership; 5) distrust in public service; and 6) distrust in public policy.  
With the Korean Democracy Barometer surveys conducted during the 1996-2001 
period [(January 1996 (N=1,000), May 1997 (N= 1,123), October 1998 (N=1,010), 
November 1999 (N= 1,007) and March and April 2001 (N= 1,005)], Shin and his 
colleagues (2005: 209) concluded that the Korean people are more dissatisfied than 
satisfied with the performance of their government. Especially, a large majority of ordinary 
Koreans, ranging from 57 percent in 1999 to 87 percent in 1997, said that they are 
dissatisfied with governmental performance, criticizing a malfunctioning government.  
The Korea Political Institute and Gallup Korea conducted a nationwide telephone 
interview of 1,014 randomly selected adults in the summer of 2007 to investigate people’s 
opinions regarding their trust and satisfaction with government compared to different 
organizations in South Korea (Gallup Korea, 2007). Table 2-1 shows a brief summary of 
the survey results. According to the data, 1) 34.7 % of respondents trust the president; 2) 
19.2 % trust the incumbent Assemblymen; 3) 14.4% have confidence in the political 
parties; and 4) 13.1% trust the National Assembly. Generally, there is a definite problem of 
high level of distrust and dissatisfaction with government and politicians in South Korea.  
 
Table 2-1 Here 
 
 13
Although it is somewhat hard to say whether process or policy concerns are 
directly related to ordinary people’s dissatisfaction and discontent with government, these 
general findings at least show that South Koreans are less satisfied with and thus more 
turned off of government as opposed to people from other countires. What drives people to 
distrust government and politics? If decision makers are involved in conflict, debate, and 
compromise, ordinary people might not only be less interested in participating in politics 
and the policy making process, but also think that the features of political processes are 
unnecessary. With regard to this point of view, a recent study in South Korea also shows 
that political processes matter by increasing people’s dislike of politicians and indifference 
to politics and the policymaking process (Im, 2006).  
This dissertation presents a new trend that ordinary people in South Korea are 
dissatisfied and discontented with government due to the policymaking process of 
politicians. But, this study does not discuss why people distrust and are dissatisfied with 
government and what factors are significantly related to people’s perceptions. If process is 
important for understanding people’s dissatisfaction and discontent with government, a 
fundamental task of this study is to explore what types of processes people want by 
comparing the merits and demerits of each process. Regarding this concern, I will discuss 
different types of processes in the next section. 
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2. The democratic processes that people want 
There is no doubt that the twentieth century has seen an impressive advance in 
democracy worldwide. 2  Accordingly, many scholars have attempted to identify the 
principal characteristics of democratic institutions and to evaluate the merits and the 
feasibility of the systems (e.g., Dahl, 1989; Held, 1996; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000). For 
example, Held (1996: xi and 1) emphasized that “democracy has become the fundamental 
standard of political legitimacy in the current era,” insisting that “democracy means a form 
of government in which the people rule and democracy entails a political community in 
which there is some form of political equality among the people.” Furthermore, he (1996: 
3) argues that “democracy has been defended on the grounds such as political equality, 
liberty, moral self-development, the common interest, a fair moral compromise, binding 
decisions that take everyone’s interest into account, social utility, the satisfaction of wants, 
and efficient decisions.” 
Additionally, many studies attempt to clarify a theory of democratic process. For 
example, Dahl (1989: 108-14) emphasizes five criteria for a democratic process: 1) 
effective participation, 2) voting equality- each citizen must be ensured an equal 
opportunity to express a choice that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice of any 
other citizen, and it is only these choice that must be taken into account, 3) enlightened 
understanding, 4) control of the agenda, and 5) inclusion- the demos should include all 
adult members of an association. Although these theoretical criteria are important for the 
                                            
2 Huntington (1991: 25) studied the third wave of democratization to investigate advances of democratic 
institutions in the world, started with the fall of the last rightist dictatorships in Western Europe (e.g., Portugal, 
Greece, and Spain) in the mid-1970s, swept through Latin America, moved on to Asia, and decimated 
dictatorship in the Soviet bloc.  
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democratic process, the most important attribute of the effective performance of democracy 
in many countries is popular support. Without support from ordinary people, it is hard to 
expect democratic institutions to improve further.  
Regarding this concern, many democratic theorists have investigated whether 
average people believe that their current regime embodies the essential properties of 
democracy, whether the people really are satisfied with their democratic system, or whether 
ordinary people really care much about most policies and the operation of their government. 
These questions have been extensively debated in the theoretical and empirical literature 
especially with regard to the nature of the relationship between levels of political 
performance and types of democracy. And, these fundamental questions provide the 
opportunity to explore in greater depth what people want concerning the process. 
Many scholars have been concerned about the erosion of political performance of 
representative democracy (e.g., Sell and Osterud, 2006) even though “it is a comprehensive 
filtering, refining, and mediating process of political will formation and expression” 
(Urbinati, 2000: 760). Shin and his colleagues (2005) argue that while most ordinary people 
have believed in representative democracy, an increasing number of citizens in many 
democracies have recently lost confidence in the performance of representative institutions. 
As Urbinati (2000: 758) contends: 
 
Representation has been given merely an instrumental justification and has 
been seen as a pragmatic expedient to cope with large territorial states, or a 
useful fiction by means of which the method of division of labor has been 
adapted to the function of government. 
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Many scholars and citizens increasingly support other types of democracy such as 
deliberative, participatory (i.e., direct or pure direct), or stealth democracy. For instance, 
deliberative democracy has been the most promising new idea in academic political theory 
since critical debates on representative democracy. According to Dryzek (2000: 1), 
The essence of democracy itself is now widely taken to be deliberation, as 
opposed to voting, interest aggregation, constitutional rights, or even self-
government. The deliberative turn represents a renewed concern with the 
authenticity of democracy: the degree to which democratic control is 
substantive rather than symbolic, and engaged by competent citizens. 
 
Deliberative democracy is presented as a solution to contemporary political 
problems: 1) political indifference (e.g., low rates of participation in elections and 
membership in political parties); 2) manipulation by the mass media; 3) alienation of 
democratic representatives from their voters; 4) exclusion or under-representation of 
unorganized minorities and over-representation of well-organized and privileged minorities; 
and 5) the effects of irrational political passions (Tucker, 2008: 127). Many scholars 
emphasizing the procedure model of democracy argue that deliberative outcomes are 
legitimate so long as they are obtained through a fair process (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Habermas; 
1996; Manin, 1987).  
Arguing that the nature of the relationship between levels of political performance 
and types of democracy vary from one democratic country to the other, many scholars insist 
that the successful democracy hinges upon the individual’s political participation, 
emphasizing direct democracy (e.g., Budge, 1996; Dalton et al., 2001; Donovan and Karp, 
2006; Scarrow, 2001). In many established democracies the use of direct democracy has 
expanded substantially since 1970 at the national and sub-national level (Scarrow, 2001). 
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Additionally, Donovan and Karp (2006: 671) insist that “the expanding use of direct 
democracy in many established democracies reflects a desire to provide citizens with more 
opportunities to be involved in the political process.” Despite this variety of explanations 
about direct democracy, there are still few studies on whether or not ordinary people really 
support direct democratic reforms.  
Some studies currently focus on general questions of ordinary people’s confidence 
in government (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Norris, 1999). Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse (2002: 44) in their book Stealth Democracy argue that people are dissatisfied with 
the dominance of institutions and elected officials in the political process because they 
believe elected officials are taking advantage of their position and are prone to conflict, 
corruption and compromise in politics and the policy making process without having the 
best interests of the public at heart. Therefore, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) introduced 
new a system called stealth democracy. The main ideas of stealth democracy is: 1) 
governmental procedures are not visible to people unless they go looking; 2) the people do 
not routinely play an active role in making decisions, in providing input to decision makers, 
or in monitoring decision makers; 3) decision making should be made by the elites who are 
non-self-interested decision makers (ENSIDs).  
This dissertation not only investigates the importance of democratic institutions, 
but also examines the effective performance of democracy for public by looking at different 
types of democratic process that affect ordinary people’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
government and politicians. But, we know comparatively little about what types of 
governmental processes are attractive to ordinary people. Answers to this question will 
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speak to the potential benefit of political science, and will also help illuminate what 
ordinary people want from the governmental process more generally. Therefore, the main 
purpose of this section is to explore different types of governmental process that ordinary 
people will support. For that, I will investigate the merits and demerits of each governing 
process respectively, based on Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s division of the decision process 
into two steps (i.e., pre-decision consideration and the decision itself). 
 
3. Four Governing Process and Possible Reforms 
 Figure 2-1 indicates four governing processes and possible reforms, based on the 
democratic governmental systems (i.e., representative, direct, and deliberative democracy). 
 
Figure 2-1 Here 
 
Elites Consider, People Decide  
The upper-right quadrant of the figure points to some governing processes in which 
preliminary discussion and consideration will be conducted by elites but the final decision 
will be controlled by ordinary people. This process can be called direct democracy. The 
referendum process and initiatives are good examples of direct democracy. Moreover, the 
expanding use of direct democracy substantially reflects a wish to provide citizens with 
more opportunities to be involved in the political process since 1970 in many established 
democracies (Donovan and Karp, 2006). At present in the U. S, many scholars find that the 
initiative process allows ordinary people to control state policy programs and check on the 
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influence of special interests (Donovan and Bowler, 2004; Magleby, 1984). Many countries, 
especially in Western Europe, allow initiatives and use referendums as well (Lupia and 
Matsusaka, 2004). However, a different perspective has been raised on direct democracy in 
general. 
Many journalists and political elites are deeply skeptical about direct democracy, 
raising some critical questions: 1) are voters competent to make policy decisions; 2) does 
direct democracy allow special interests to subvert the policy process; 3) does it empower 
citizens to counteract special interest influence in the legislature; and 4) is money too 
important in initiative campaigns (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004). By the same token, some 
scholars argue that direct democracy could promote majority tyranny at the expense of the 
interests of minorities (e.g., Saeki, 2006). 
 
Elites Consider, Elites Decide  
The lower-right quadrant of the figure indicates some governing processes in 
which elites not only consider political proposals but also decide on them by themselves. 
These governmental procedures can be called standard representative government (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 165). Today, most democracies in general adopt this system. 
Regarding representative government, the Madisonian theory of democracy emphasizes a 
compromise between the power of majorities and the power of minorities, between the 
political equality of all adult citizens on the one side, and the desire to limit their 
sovereignty on the other (Dahl, 1956: 4).  
However, many political scholars are skeptical about this issue. A crucial condition 
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of democracy is a requirement of diversity of opinions. But, because consideration and 
decisions will be made by elites, it would be hard to expect ordinary people to voice their 
interests and opinions in policy and the policymaking process. For example, elected 
representative political institutions tend to promote political alienation and reduce people’s 
participation in the political process (Schweizer, 1995: 367). 
 
People Consider, Elites Decide  
The lower-left quadrant of the figure denotes some governing processes in which 
the people consider political proposals and elites decide on them. These government 
procedures can be called deliberation democracy. A main proposition of this procedure is 
that the system would be improved if people were more involved. Though elected officials 
have powers and responsibilities for making final decisions on policies, scholars expect that 
elected officials would be informed by rich and sustained deliberations on the part of 
ordinary people (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 166-7). Given that democracy in 
general is a form of government in which government ensures citizens’ liberty and basic 
rights based upon the principles of sovereignty, the public’s political participation, and 
limited government power, the public in a democracy is not passive but participatory. 
Moreover, the people’s political participation is a chance to enhance civil rights. Based on 
the crucial principles of democracy, many scholars who have been concerned about the 
people’s distrust and discontent with government systems positively argue that deliberation 
is an important element of the democratic systems. 
 Many political scientists interested in deliberation democracy (especially 
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associative democracy) argue that the civic associations and volunteer organizations will 
efficiently enhance ordinary people’s political participation. In recent studies, Putnam 
(1993) pointed to associative democracy as a core of democracy and developed the idea of 
social capital (i.e., trust, norms, and networks) that can build up virtuous circles. The 
virtuous circles result in social equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, 
civic engagement, and collective well-being (Putnam, 1993). Arguing that political 
difficulties in the United States are due to a decline in social capital, he claims that social 
capital and the virtuous circles can play an important role in making democracy work 
(Putnam, 1995). More recently, Putnam (2007) argues that in ethnically diverse 
neighbourhoods residents of all races in the U. S tend to reduce social solidarity and social 
capital. However, successful immigrant societies have overcome such fragmentation by 
creating new, cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities. 
Counterarguments on deliberation democracy exist, however. Many scholars are 
casting doubts about whether deliberation democracy will work as leverage to control and 
check the government and policies instead of representative democracy. Many scholars are 
convinced that ordinary people in the U. S rarely know what policies are, often are 
misinformed, or have changeable attitudes toward government and policies (Converse, 
1964; Delli et al., 1996; Kuklinski et al., 2000). Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that 
deliberation democracy not only promotes enlightenment and consensus, but also leads to a 
better decision and system.  
 
People Consider, People Decide   
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The procedures in the upper-left quadrant imply that elites do not need to be 
involved in policy making process. In other words, all consideration and decisions will be 
made by the people instead of elites. Additionally, it is not necessary to have existing 
institutions of representative government because ordinary people would discuss and make 
all policy decisions. These government procedures can be called a pure direct democracy 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 168-9). A good example of this process is the town 
meeting (e.g., the New England town hall meeting) in the U. S.  
 There are two different perspectives regarding pure direct democracy (especially 
town hall meeting government). First, many scholars insist that town hall government is the 
purest form of democracy in that the meeting maximizes citizen participation, allows 
ordinary voters to hold administrative officers directly accountable, provides psychological 
benefits for attendees, preserves local customs, including the town hall meeting supper and 
citizen service as town officers, and performs citizen education and community-building 
functions (e.g., Tocqueville, 1988; Lowell, 1921).3  
 Conversely, some scholars and politicians have criticized town hall government for 
several reasons: 1) this law-making institution is not the purest form of democracy; 2) the 
town hall meeting often is dominated by special interest groups; 3) the town hall meeting 
could function successfully only in small rural towns; and so on (e.g., Zimmerman, 1999: 
5-9).  
                                            
3 For example, Tocqueville argues that “The New Englander is attached to his township because it is strong 
and independent; he has an interest in it because he shares in its management; he loves it because he has no 
reason to complain of his lot; he invests his ambition and his future in it; in the restricted sphere within his 
scope he learns to rule society; he gets to know those formalities without which freedom can advance only 
through revolutions, and becoming imbued with their spirit, develops a taste for order, understands the 
harmony of powers, and in the end accumulates clear, practical ideas about the nature of his duties and the 
extent of his rights” (1988: 70).  
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Until now, the two-by-two figure indicated merits and demerits of the various types 
of democracy (i.e., direct, deliberation, and representative democracy) depending on the 
role people play in considering various proposals and then in selecting which proposals to 
adopt (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 238). However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse raised 
crucial questions with regard to the various types of democracy: 1) are the people willing to 
be involved in government and policies with different types of governing processes?; 2) 
what do the people really want out of politics?; or 3) do the people only get involved when 
they believe that by doing so they might be able to diminish the amount of self-serving 
action in government? Based on an in-depth study, they conclude that ordinary Americans 
do not want a bigger role in government and politics. People would prefer to have a smaller 
role but they suspect that elites are corrupt, so they believe that citizens must periodically 
intervene just to prevent corruption. These are some of the themes of stealth democracy. 
The question still remains, though, why do Americans believe that stealth democracy is 
preferable to real democracy?  
 
Figure 2-2 Here 
 
Stealth Democracy 
By challenging the conventional perception that ordinary people like to be involved 
in government and policies, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse have emphasized “stealth 
democracy.” 4  With empirical evidence, they argue that “the consequences of group 
                                            
4 Stealth democracy is the idea that: (1) the people want democratic decision-making processes in which 
everyone can voice an opinion, but they do not prefer to see or to hear the debate resulting from the 
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involvement and of exposure to deliberation indicates that neither of the main approaches 
currently being advocated by normative theorists holds much potential for getting people to 
deal with political conflict in a more realistic, comfortable, and accepting fashion” (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 208). This study provides legitimacy to their argument (i.e., 
stealth democracy). Based on their argument (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 238) that 
“if ordinary people could choose their ideal political arrangement, a surprising number of 
Americans would select a set of processes that required even less of their involvement and 
attention than standard representative theory,” Figure 2-2 shows a modified set of 
democratic procedures. Based on Figure 2-2, it can be argued that ordinary people expect 
decisions to be made by non-self-interested decision makers and they do not want to see the 
debate and the conflict in democratic decision-making processes. In other words, more 
debates and conflicts among elected officials lead the people to be turned off by 
government, policies, and the policymaking process.  
Regarding the different types of governmental processes (i.e., representative, 
deliberative, participative (pure direct or direct), and stealth democracy), it can be insisted 
that “making good decisions, perceiving the system as legitimate, and helping the people in 
society be happy are fundamental tasks in a successful democratic governmental system” 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 163). Although the extent to which any democracy 
attempts to accomplish these three tasks can always be improved and every effort should be 
                                                                                                                                     
expression of these inevitably diverse opinions; (2) people want to turn political matters over to somebody 
else because they do not want to be involved themselves, but they do not want to turn decision making over to 
someone who is likely to act in a selfish, rather than other-regarding manner; (3) people would most prefer 
decisions to be made by empathetic and non-self-interested decision makers; (4) people might just want to 
turn politics over to someone else if only they could trust that someone else to act in the interest of the people 
as a whole (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995: 19; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 85-6). 
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made to do so, it is important to understand what ordinary people really support concerning 
certain governmental processes. In turn, the next section will discuss factors causing 
ordinary people’s negative views toward government and politicians and variables 
predicting their preference type of democratic process.  
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4. The determinants of different types of democratic process 
What I have tried to do so far is to look at different types of political processes in 
order to investigate what governmental processes the people of South Korea really prefer. If 
the people of South Korea prefer representative, deliberative, participatory, or stealth 
processes, the most important task I have to do is to explore what factors predict ordinary 
people’s process preference. Therefore, I will investigate what factors predict the process 
preferences of ordinary people by focusing on two key features of South Korean politics 
that drive much of what goes on in the political system: South Korea’s policy toward North 
Korea, especially the Sunshine Policy, and regionalism. South Korea’s North Korea policy 
has long been wrapped up in ideological, regional, and partisan fissures within South 
Korean society. Regionalism, another notable feature of South Korean politics, remains a 
powerful force in shaping voter identity and behavior and has had enormous influence in 
driving South Korea’s political debates and conflicts among politicians. Additionally, 
several variables, such as individual attitudes toward various parts of the political system 
and political participation, are important to determine if the people prefer a certain type of 
democratic process in South Korea. Based on these two factors and several independent 
variables, I will specifically propose several hypotheses.  
 
4-1. South Korea’s Policy toward North Korea and types of democratic process 
Since the Korean War, has South Korea’s policy toward North Korea made 
ordinary people dissatisfied with government, politicians, and elected officials? And, does 
the South Korea’s policy toward North Korea influence ordinary Koreans’ preference for a 
 27
certain type of democracy? After the establishment of the two separate states in the 
peninsula in 1948, and even more since the Korean War of 1950-53, both states have kept 
their own political structures. Under the circumstances of the division of Korea into North 
and South, the confrontation with North Korea has been one of the important features 
affecting domestic politics in South Korea. Moreover, the North Korea situation has 
dominated South Korea’s political debates and conflicts among politicians, and has proved 
irksome at times to ordinary people in South Korea. For example, Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun’s engagement policy, known as the Sunshine Policy, with North Korea has two 
different interpretations. Therefore, I will examine whether their debates and conflicts with 
regard to policy and the policy making process toward North Korea bother or even anger 
ordinary people. I will focus on differences of political ideology, such as progressives vs. 
conservatives, with regard to the Sunshine Policy and the policy making process. 
 
Sunshine Policy toward North Korea  
What is the Sunshine Policy? By breaking away from a long-standing political 
disgrace from conservatives (i.e., Kim Dae-jung was pro-North Korea or was even thought 
of as a crypto-communist), the 1997 presidential election brought fresh thinking toward 
North Korea (Hoare, 2008). Kim Dae-jung played the leading role in the Sunshine Policy. 
The Sunshine Policy was South Korea’s main policy toward North Korea until Lee Myung-
bak’s election to the presidency in 2008. The Sunshine Policy focused on seeking peace in 
the Korean Peninsula via reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea. Believing that 
the settlement of peace through coexistence is important for reunification in the Korean 
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Peninsula, the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the so called “Government of the People,” 
adopted the Sunshine Policy based on three principles: 1) we will not tolerate any armed 
provocation hampering peace on the peninsula; 2) we will not try to harm or absorb North 
Korea; and 3) we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea (the 
Ministry of Unification, 1999). 
Assenting to Kim Dae-jung’s policy, President Roh Moo-hyun (2004-08) adopted 
the Sunshine Policy as his main policy toward North Korea, emphasizing peace with North 
Korea (Hoare, 2008: 80). Having confidence in Kim’s Sunshine Policy, Rho’s government 
continued to support North Korea with humanitarian aid, though many debates and 
conflicts occurred from the opposition parties (especially the Grand National Party, GNP).  
Taking a harsher stance toward the Sunshine Policy, the GNP raised big questions: 
1) what role should reciprocity play in this effort?; 2) what should be the nature and scale 
of South Korean assistance to North Korea?; 3) how should political efforts to engage 
North Korea be balanced against South Korea’s security and other important interests?; and 
4) how should the effectiveness of the government’s policies be evaluated (Levin and Han, 
2002: ix-x). Concerning the Sunshine Policy, numerous debates and conflicts had occurred 
from the opposite parties (especially the GNP). For example, the GNP criticized the 
Sunshine Policy for failing to bring about any meaningful changes in North Korean politics. 
The GNP also blamed the Sunshine Policy for most South Koreans having lost patience 
with North Korea, arguing that Kim Jong-il had continued on with his nuclear weapons 
program financed largely with South Korean aid during the past ten years the Sunshine 
Policy had been in place (Hoare, 2008: 81).  
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Opposing the Sunshine Policy, new President Lee Myung-bak, who was the leader 
of the GNP and the first conservative South Korean president in a decade, announced that 
his administration would create a new diplomacy toward North Korea (Korea Times, 
December 19, 2007).5 As a first step, President Lee Myung-bak on January 17, 2008 
proposed eliminating a government agency that has long led efforts to build reconciliation 
with North Korea, accusing that two previous governments (Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo 
Hyun) spent billions of dollars for North Korea to sustain inter-Korean talks and maintain 
the Sunshine Policy without having any benefits from it (The New York Times, January 17, 
2008). In accord with Lee’s reproach, the GNP also is convinced that the two previous 
administrations’ Sunshine Policies were not sine qua non for unification in the Korean 
peninsula. Thus, many ordinary people who support Lee’s administration and the GNP are 
casting doubt whether the Sunshine Policy worked as a leverage to persuade North Korea to 
give up its nuclear weapons ambition, and open up and reform the isolated nation (Korea 
Gallup, 2008). 
This new policy of the Lee administration toward North Korea has also ignited new 
political debates and conflicts among politicians. These two different approaches toward 
North Korea stick in the people’s craw because such debates and conflicts cannot be 
expected to end overnight.6 In other words, without unification in the Korean peninsula, 
people believe that political conflicts and debates on South Korea’s policy and even the 
decision making process toward North Korea will be a never-ending story in South Korea. 
                                            
5 In the context, Lee Myung-bak’s administration is promising to maintain the relationship only if North 
Korea dismantles its nuclear program and opens its doors to the outside world. 
6  Before implementing Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy toward North Korea, previous governments 
(especially Roh Tae Woo (1988-93) and Kim Young Sam (1993-98)) emphasized the three-step unification 
policy toward North Korea, cooperating with the GNP (Levin and Han, 2002: 68).  
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Therefore, it can be argued that ordinary people in South Korea seem disenchanted with the 
political division in the decision making process on its policy toward North Korea. To 
support this argument, there are numerous pieces of evidence related to people’s attitude 
toward government associated with process or policy matters. Let’s look at some of the 
evidence. 
In accordance with Kim Dea-jung’s political principle toward North Korea, many 
people believed that the government’s Sunshine Policy would work to ease tensions 
between the two Koreas and encourage a more open dialog with North Korea. For instance, 
the rate of public support for the Sunshine Policy was both relatively high (e.g., 80-94 
percnet of respondents agreed with the policy) and relatively consistent across the polls 
(Levin and Han, 2002: 86). However, during the Roh government, the policy contributed to 
polarizing the debate among the politicians and thus undermined public consensus behind 
the governments’ policies. The bulk of the evidence supports the argument that ordinary 
people were upset with the government, its policy and the policy making process. For 
example, the Korea Gallup and Chosun Newspaper in 2005 conducted a nationwide survey 
investigating individuals’ attitudes toward South Korea’s policy, focusing on the Sunshine 
Policy toward North Korea. They asked “do you think that government’s policy toward 
North Korea has worked well?” The result showed that 46.3 percent of respondents said 
“no” and 46.4 percent of respondents said “yes” (Korea Gallup, 2005). Based on these 
findings, many scholars argue that the two governments (i.e., Kim and Roh’s governments) 
have made the engagement policy the core issue in a much larger political and ideological 
struggle (e.g., Jim, 2008), and thus this allowed the opposition parties, especially the GNP, 
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to erode the administration’s ethical authority and political standing. Hence, it is evident 
that ordinary people were dissatisfied and discontented with government and politicians.  
In summary, Korean conservatives, such as the Grand National Party (GNP), have 
emphasized the health and security of the nation, focusing on a close partnership with the U. 
S. and vigilance against the ever-menacing threat from North Korea.7 They are skeptical of 
engagement with North Korea, pointing to North Korea’s nuclear policy and its belligerent 
behaviors. In contrast, progressives, such as the United Democratic Party (UDP), radically 
oppose the conservatives’ perspectives. They view North Korea more as a kin nation, 
emphasizing reconciliation and cooperation with each other (Chae and Kim, 2008: 77), and 
support Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s engagement policy, the Sunshine Policy, with 
North Korea, although they dislike North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  
The Sunshine Policy ignited serious political debates and conflicts among 
politicians (progressives vs. conservatives), and these debates and conflicts cannot be 
expected to end overnight. In other words, without unification in the Korean peninsula, 
people believe that political conflicts and debates on South Korea’s policy and even the 
decision making process toward North Korea will be a never-ending story. Therefore, it can 
be argued that ordinary people in South Korea seem to groan about the political debates and 
conflicts in the decision making process on its policy toward North Korea.  
Given people’s frustration with politicians concerning the North Korea policy, what type of 
democratic process do they prefer? If the political environment of South Korea is similar to 
                                            
7 The successive authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and Chun Doo Hwan had 
constantly promoted anti-Communist ideology and national security concerns to control any political 
movement questioning the legitimacy of the regimes (Shin, 2004: 18).  
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the U.S., the following hypothesis can be proposed: the more ordinary South Koreans are 
dissatisfied by government policy and the policy making process toward North Korea, the 
more likely South Koreans will have a preference for stealth democracy. 
If the political environment of South Korea is different from the U. S. and if ordinary South 
Koreans are disappointed by government and politicians because they believe that the 
government and politicians failed to obtain much result toward North Korea under 
representative democracy, I propose the following hypothesis: the more ordinary South 
Koreans are disappointed by government policy and the policy making process toward 
North Korea, the more likely South Koreans will have a preference for either 
participatory or deliberative democracy. The null hypothesis is: there is no relationship 
between South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and ordinary South Koreans’ 
preference for types of democracy.  
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4-2. Regionalism and types of democratic process 
Many scholars have tried to explain the origin of regionalism in South Korea 
through analyses of historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors (Yang, 1994; Yea, 1994; 
Kim, 1998). Kim (2003: 4) claims that “South Korea has yet to be geographically, socially, 
culturally, and politically unified within its own borders with having chronically fratricidal 
regional factionalism, searing labor-management conflict, and right/left ideological 
cleavages.” But the real problem of regionalism had arisen from the political division 
between conservatives, especially in Kyongsang provinces, who value stability, and order 
and progressives, especially in Cholla provinces, who value leftist ideals. Originally, in the 
7th presidential election of 1971, there were regional differences for supporting the two 
candidates, with Cholla provinces going for Kim Dae Jung who was the most influential 
leader of the progressives and Kyongsang provinces for Park Chung Hee who was the 
leading conservative. Since then, the political and ideological fracture between the two 
political leaders had expanded to the political parties. Moreover, the political parties have 
manipulated and exploited regional sentiments, which has intensified the animosity 
between Cholla provinces and Kyongsang provinces over the past four decades (Shin, 
2004: 25). In the 1992 presidential election, Kim Daejung, who is a native of the Southern 
Cholla province, gathered an overwhelming 89 percent of Cholla (Northern and Southern 
Cholla region) votes but a mere 9 percent of Kyongsang (Northern and Southern 
Kyongsang region) votes. In contrast, Kim Young Sam who is a native of the Kyongsang 
region gathered 69 percent of the Kyongsang votes but a mere 5 percent of the Cholla votes. 
During the presidential election in1997, many people and scholars expected a similar result. 
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Their prediction was correct. Kim Daejung earned an overwhelming 93 percent of Cholla 
votes, while Lee Hoi Chang, who was a successor of Kim Young Sam and a leader of the 
GNP, gathered 60 percent of Kyongsan votes (National Election Commission, 1993; 
National Election Commission, 1998).  
General elections in South Korea have not been able to escape from this 
regionalism. Table 2-2 shows not only a regional split among parties in local district seats 
in the 2004 general election, but also indicates a good example of the serious problem of 
political antagonisms with regard to regionalism in South Korea. This election result 
indicates that the party system in South Korea is converging on two major parties, the 
conservative GNP (which is the current ruling party after the presidential election in 2007) 
and the progressive Uri Party (the Uri Party and the Millennium Democratic Party, MDP, 
formed a coalition, thus they created the United Democratic Party, UDP). As expected, the 
GNP gathered 52.5 percent of Pusan (which is the largest city in the Kyongsan region) 
votes. On the other hand, the Uri Party gathered 54 percent of the Kwangju vote (which is 
the largest city in the Cholla region) (National Election Commission, 2005).  
 
Table 2-2 Here 
 
In a nutshell, many scholars argue that regionalism is undoubtedly one of the most 
formidable and frequently crucial barriers to stable democracy in South Korea (Kim, 1987; 
Kim, 1990; Kim, 1990; Kwon, 2004; Moon, 1990; Moon, 2005; Noh and Park, 1997).8 In 
                                            
8 According to Lipset (1963: 52), “the poorer the country, the greater the emphasis on nepotism- support of 
kin, friends, and same regional people.” And he argues that “this in turn reduces the opportunity to develop 
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particular, political regionalism shapes politicians’ political strategies. By social and 
regional polarization, politicians attempt to take extreme positions, are unwilling to tolerate 
opposing views, and allow little room for cooperation and reconciliation in political 
disagreements.  
Given people’s dissatisfaction and discontent, that is caused by regionalism, with 
political parties and politicians, what type of democratic process do they prefer? If the 
political environment of South Korea is similar to the U.S., the following hypothesis can be 
proposed: the more ordinary South Koreans are concerned about political regionalism, 
the more likely South Koreans are to have a preference for either direct or stealth 
democracy. If the political environment of South Korea is different from the U.S. and if 
ordinary people regard political regionalism as a crucial factor to gain their regional 
interests under representative democracy, the following hypothesis can be proposed: the 
more ordinary South Koreans are interested in political regionalism, the more likely they 
are to have a preference for representative democracy. The null hypothesis is: there is no 
relationship between political regionalism and ordinary South Koreans’ preference for 
democracy types. 
                                                                                                                                     
the efficient bureaucracy which a modern democratic state requires” (1963: 52). 
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4-3. Public attitudes toward the overall political system 
 There is no doubt that successful achievement of democratization in South Korea 
rested on an ordinary people’s long and painful struggle against authoritarian rule and 
military dictatorships (Huntington, 1991; Kim, 2003). However, a large majority of people 
are concerned about an immature political system that does not represent the interesting of 
all Koreans (Shin et al., 2005: 209-10). Ordinary people are deeply concerned about the 
common problems that confront everybody every day. Though the governance of 
democracy is a supply (i.e., government) and demand (i.e., the people) relationship (Rose et 
al., 1999: 147), government and elected officials are unable to provide what the people 
want. Rather, most politicians and bureaucrats attempt to maximize career success rather 
than what ordinary people really want (e.g., Geddes, 1996:7). Therefore, ordinary Koreans 
negatively evaluate and distrust the overall political system (Jun and Kim, 2002; Shin et al., 
2005).  
Given the concerns, an important task in this study is to understand how public 
attitudes toward the overall political system with regard to basic government structures, 
public policies, government operations, and the current political system affect their 
preference for certain types of democracy.9  If ordinary people are dissatisfied with 
government structures, the current public policies, government operations, and the current 
political system, they might be more inclined to support an alternative type of democracy. 
                                            
9 To determine the degree of public attitudes toward the overall political system, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
(2002: 102-4) classified into four categories as followings: 1) basic government structures; 2) the public 
policies the government has produced lately; 3) government operation like a business; and 4) the current 
political system. 
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Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 1) the more people are dissatisfied and 
discontented with the overall political system, the more likely they are to prefer either 
participatory or stealth democracy; 2) there is no relationship between public attitudes 
toward the overall political system and types of democratic processes.  
Or, if people are somewhat satisfied with government structures, the current public policies, 
government operations, and the current political system, they may be inclined to support 
the current type of government. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: the more 
people are satisfied and contented with the overall political system, the more likely they 
will support representative democracy.  
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4-4. Approval of various parts of the government 
Previous research points out that popular approval of government is driven by 
process concerns rather than policy concerns. If people favor how the government operates, 
they will be more likely to approve of government (Hibbing and Theiss-Morese, 2002: 67-
71). In other words, visible processes of government affect people’s approval or 
disapproval of government. For instance, people have a more favorable image of the 
Supreme Court than the Congress in the U.S. because the Supreme Court does its work 
behind closed doors and away from the public’s view (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2002: 67). Regarding this empirical result, several questions can be raised. Why are 
ordinary Koreans dissatisfied with the National Assembly and elected officials? Why did a 
large majority of Koreans believe President Lee Myung-bak to be cold and belligerent after 
his first radio address? To what extent do visible processes of government influence public 
views toward government? Additionally, to what extent is there a relationship between 
visible processes of government and ordinary people’s preference for certain types of 
democratic process?  
Some theoretical literatures point out that when ordinary people’s expectation of 
the government is disappointed, distrust might rapidly grow (e.g., Jun and Kim, 2002). 
Today, a wide array of media sources such as cable TV, Internet, and radio give information 
to the public about how the political process works (Funk, 2001: 193; Macedo et al., 2005: 
41). The visible processes of government through the media influence ordinary people’s 
belief about whether government and politicians perform their roles responsibly and act on 
behalf of the public. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1998: 494) argued, “media exposure is 
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clearly related to negative emotional reactions.” Using a national survey (N=1430) in 1992, 
they (1998: 494) point out that “a reliance on electronic media for news produces more in 
the way of negative emotions toward Congress than a reliance on print media.” While this 
empirical study makes a major contribution in explaining the relationship between media 
exposure and negative emotions toward Congress, they focus primarily on Congress 
without consideration of different governments. Additionally, this study does not lead us to 
conclude that people’s view of government affect the types of democratic process that 
ordinary people want.  
Regarding these concerns about the relationship between visible processes of 
government and public views toward government, I offer the following hypothesis: people 
who see the government operating the way they want it to operate will be more likely to 
approve of government than will those who see the governmental process as flawed. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that ordinary people’s approval or disapproval of 
government is significantly related to their desire for certain democratic processes. For 
example, those who approve of how the government operates might prefer the 
representative democratic process because they are somewhat satisfied with government 
operations. Otherwise, those who disapprove of government operations might support the 
participatory or stealth democratic process. Therefore, I offer the following hypotheses: 1) 
the more people approve of the actual working of government, the more likely they are to 
support representative democratic process; 2) the more people disapprove of the actual 
working of government, the more like they will support participatory or stealth 
democratic processes; 3) there is no relationship between approval of government 
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operations and types of democratic process.  
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4-5. Political participation and activities 
For the past two hundred years many countries pursuing democratic institutions 
have been struggling with the questions of what roles citizens should play in politics and 
who should be entitled to enact these roles (Olsen, 1982:37). Regarding citizens’ roles in 
the democratic process, many political scientists emphasize the importance of citizens’ 
political participation (e.g., Dalton, 2006, 2008; Olsen, 1982). For example, Olsen 
(1982:37) emphasizes citizen involvement in politics, arguing that “widespread citizen 
involvement in politics does not necessarily result in political democracy; but if citizens fail 
to participate actively in political affairs, they will certainly remain politically powerless.” 
Additionally, Dalton (2008: 53) regards citizen involvement in politics as a fundamental 
function of democratic process, saying that: 
 
Political participation is at the heart of democratic theory and at the heart of the 
democratic political formula…without public involvement in the process, 
democracy lacks both its legitimacy and its guiding force. 
 
Many political scientists are concerned about the declining political participation 
rates in many countries (e.g., Dalton, 2008; Macedo et al., 2005; Putman, 1995). Some 
political scholars of civic engagement have examined more diffuse ways of participating in 
democratic processes. For example, emphasizing different types of citizens’ roles in 
political activity, Putman (1995: 35) argues that “declining electoral participation is merely 
the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from community life.”  
In that context, it can be argued that diverse ways of political participation are the 
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important factors that determine what types of political process that ordinary people prefer. 
Regarding this argument, it can be proposed the following hypotheses: 1) the more 
ordinary Koreans are interested in public activities such as community action and protest, 
the more they support participatory democratic process; 2) the more ordinary Koreans 
are disinterested in public activities, the more they support the representative democracy.  
Additionally, given the main ideas of stealth democracy, I hypothesize: 1) the more 
ordinary Koreans are to be interested in public activities such as community action and 
protest, the less likely they support stealth democracy; 2) there is no relationship between 
political participation and activities and ordinary Koreans’ preference for stealth 
democracy.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESSIGN, METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
To test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter II regarding the relationships between 
each factor (i.e., South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, regionalism, public attitudes 
toward the overall political system, approval of various parts of the government, political 
participation and activities, and demographic variables) and different types of democratic 
processes (i.e., representative, participatory, deliberative, and stealth democracy), I have to 
discuss how concepts are to be operationalized. Additionally, given that the main purpose 
of this dissertation is to test the impact of South Korea’s policy and policy making process 
toward North Korea, regionalism, and other factors on a person’s opinions about different 
types of democratic processes, a survey design is an excellent way to provide “a 
quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by 
studying a sample of that population” (Creswell, 2003: 153).  
Regarding these concerns, this part of the dissertation is organized into four 
sections. The first section will discuss the size of the target population, including how many 
people will be in the sample and the sampling methods. For example, what will be the 
procedure for sampling this demographic and what instrument will be used in the survey? 
The questions concerning sampling and instrumentation will be briefly discussed in the first 
section. The second section will explain the dependent and independent variables, 
discussing why I am including these variables and how to measure the variables 
respectively. The third section will briefly discuss the model I will use in this study. Finally, 
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the fourth section will present information about the steps involved in analyzing the data, 
identifying the statistics and the statistical computer program for testing the major 
hypotheses in this study.  
 
1. The population and sample & instrumentation 
First, the target population in this dissertation is South Koreans. Second, the survey 
population is voting-age (age 20 and older) adults of all provinces: residents of Seoul and 
Kyung-Gi province, Choong-Chung provinces, Kang-Won Province, Cholla provinces, Je-
ju Province and Kyongsang provinces.  
In order to find respondents, there are several sampling methods: 1) nonprobability 
sampling methods (e.g., purposive sample, volunteer subjects, haphazard sample); and 2) 
probability sampling methods (e.g., simple random sample, stratified sample, cluster 
sample, and so on) (Weisberg et al., 1996: 49). However, each sampling method has 
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, I have to carefully draw a sample. For instance, if 
I draw a simple random sample such as a telephone survey, accuracy can be estimated and 
sampling error can be estimated. But, it is too expensive.10 If I draw volunteer subjects, it 
is hard for me to expect the sample to be representative of the population. Another option 
that is becoming increasingly popular with political scientists is the Internet survey. 
However, there are advantages and disadvantages of Internet surveys as well. 
For example, if respondents have problems with the survey questions, Internet 
                                            
10 I contacted a public opinion census agency (Re-Poll) to ask about the budget of conducting a telephone 
survey. The research company requires $25 per person. If my sample size is 400, I have to pay about $10,000 
to conduct the telephone survey in South Korea.  
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surveys can not offer explanation to them. To solve this concern, I already conducted a pilot 
survey with 11 exchange students who came from South Korea to ensure questions would 
be understood properly. Additionally, it can be argued that online research is considered to 
have less representative sampling than other research methods, concerning biased research 
participation and distorted research results. But, as the population of Internet users grows, 
on-line research through the Internet is on the rise. For example, according to National 
Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA) (2008), the Internet usage rate for 
population ages 6 and over is 77.1%.11 Therefore, representative sampling is not main 
concern in this study. Regarding biased research participation and distorted research results, 
I directly contacted to MBIZON, which is a public opinion census agency in South Korea, 
in order to solve these concerns. According to MBIZON, they are able to technically filter 
age groups in order to reduce biased distribution of age in the Internet survey. Therefore, it 
can be said that biased research participation can be minimized. Distorted research results 
can be avoided as well.12 
On the other hand, there are advantages of Internet surveys. For example, in-home 
personal interviews are the most expensive per completed contact, while the e-mail and 
Web surveys tend to be the cheapest. Telephone and in-home personal interview methods 
require large field staffs, while the Internet survey does not require it. Additionally, one of 
the most important advantages of Internet-based surveys is their level of information 
control. For example, the computer displays each question exactly as the researcher 
                                            
11 According to NIDA (2008), more than 98% of those ages 10-19 (99.9%), the 20s (99.7%) and the 30s 
(98.6%) use the Internet in South Korea. Internet usage rate of those in their 40s is 82.0%, while the rate for 
the 50s and those 60 and over is 48.9% and 19.0%, respectively.  
12 MBIZON gathered data as followings: 20s is 171 (28.7%) out of 599, 30s is 170 (28.4%) out of 599, 40s is 
137 (22.9%) out of 599, and 50s and more are 120 (20%) out of 599 respectively.  
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intended. It shows only the questions and information that the respondent should see and it 
displays the next question only when an acceptable answer to the current one is entered on 
the keyboard (Gilbert et al.:221-7). In light of the advantages and disadvantages of Internet 
survey, the survey method is useful in this study. Therefore, I used the Internet survey to 
randomly find respondents and gather data for this study. 
I used “MBIZON”, a public opinion census agency in South Korea, to find survey 
respondents. Data were collected from surveys of South Koreans 20 years of age and older 
(i.e., voting age). The total number of participants was 599. The survey is based on 
sampling at the individual level with selection based on categories of age, sex, and 
geographic regions. The procedure for choosing the sample is as follows: respondents for 
the survey were chosen by means of random selection. In order to find respondents, 
“MBIZON” sent e-mail surveys to randomly chosen people who are on panels of the 
MBIZON or member of one of the large websites, such as daum.net or yahoo.co.kr, and 
they asked them to voluntarily participate in the survey.  
 
2. Variables in the study 
2-1. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variables are beliefs in representative, deliberative, direct, pure 
direct and stealth democracies. Different types of democracy were measured using the 
following questions: 1) If the Korean people carefully considered and discussed all political 
issues instead of relying on politicians to do this, the country would be a lot better off; 2) If 
the Korean people decided all political issues directly in operating their government instead 
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of relying on politicians, the country would be a lot better off. Responses were coded: 4= 
strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree.  
If a person answers both questions “strongly agree or agree”, it can be said that 
he/she is a supporter of pure direct democracy. If a person answers both questions “disagree 
or strongly disagree”, it can be said that he/she is a supporter of representative democracy. 
If a person answers the first question “disagree or strongly disagree” and the second 
question “strongly agree or agree”, it can be said that he/she holds direct democracy beliefs. 
Finally, if a person answers the first question “strongly agree or agree” and the second 
question “disagree or strongly disagree”, it can be said that he/she holds deliberative 
democracy beliefs.  
Based upon criteria of beliefs in stealth democracy, these beliefs were measured 
using the following questions: 
1) “Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take 
action on important problems,” responses were coded: 4= strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = 
disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree.  
2) “What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles,” 
responses were coded: 4= strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree. 
3) “Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business 
people,” responses were coded: 4= strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly 
disagree. Or, “Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, 
independent experts rather than politicians or the people,” responses were coded: 4= 
strongly agree, 3 = agree, 2 = disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree (Hibbing and Theiss-
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Morse, 2002: 248).  
In terms of statistical analysis, respondents need to agree with either the successful 
business people or the independent experts question to be assigned 1. The range of stealth 
democracy is from 0 (no stealth democracy tendencies) to 3 (all stealth democracy 
tendencies). If a person holds all three stealth democratic attitudes, it can be said that he/she 
is a strong supporter of stealth democracy; otherwise he/she is a weaker support of stealth 
democracy.  
 
2-2. The Independent Variables 
 Conditional independence is the assumption that values are assigned to explanatory 
variables independent of the values taken by the dependent variables (King et al., 1994: 94). 
Thus, in this study, the independent variables were measured by survey items that assess 
issue attitudes (i.e., South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and regionalism), negative 
view of disagreement, approval of various parts of the government, attitude toward 
government, political knowledge, political ideology, political participation/activities and 
demographic characteristics (gender, age, income, education, region).  
 The policy variables of this study are South Korea’s policy toward North Korea 
and regionalism. As mentioned above, these are not only unique factors, but also these 
factors have historically been observed as crucial to causing ordinary people’s discontent 
and distrust of their government. In this respect, it can be inferred that if ordinary people 
disapprove of the two factors, they will prefer stealth democracy. Therefore, these policy 
variables are important.  
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South Korea’s policy toward North Korea is coded in terms of responses to the 
following question: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, 
or not at all satisfied with South Korea’s policy toward North Korea?”: Respondents were 
coded from 1 through 4, in which 1= not at all satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = fairly 
satisfied, and 4 = very satisfied.  
The Sunshine Policy toward North Korea is coded in terms of responses to the 
following question: “Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied with the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea”; “When people criticize the 
Sunshine Policy, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable”; “The Sunshine Policy failed to bring 
about any meaningful changes in North Korean politics”: Respondents were coded from 1 
through 4, in which 1= not at all satisfied, 2 = not very satisfied, 3 = fairly satisfied, and 4 = 
very satisfied.  
South Korea’s policy making process toward North Korea is coded in terms of 
responses to the following questions: “When elected officials debate about North Korea, 
you feel uneasy, uncomfortable, and even angry”; “There are too many compromises 
among politicians when discussing and debating the policy toward North Korea”: 
Respondents were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 
= agree, and 4 = strongly agree. 
Regionalism is a variable coded from responses to the following questions: “On the 
whole, do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that regionalism is a 
barrier to reviving the nation’s democratic development and stable society”; “Kyongsan 
provinces are more devolved than Cholla provinces in terms of regional economy”; “The 
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GNP is more willing to work for the people living in Kyongsang provinces than the people 
living in Cholla provinces”; “The UDP is more willing to work for the people living in 
Cholla provinces than the people living in Kyongsang provinces”. Responses were coded 
from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly 
agree. 
Regionalism and process matters is coded in terms of responses to the following 
question: “When the GNP and the UDP debate on a certain issue, you feel uneasy and 
uncomfortable.” Responses were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly disagree, 2 
= disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree. 
The third independent variable is approval of various parts of the government. 
According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 67), “it is unlikely that people will equate 
process frustrations with parts of the government that keep their procedures hidden from 
the public eye” and that people will believe the government is partial to special interests. 
For example, as indicated earlier, it can be inferred that because Congress is more visible to 
the public than the Supreme Court through diverse channels such as cable TV, we expect 
that people are likely to draw more on their process frustrations when assessing the 
Congress.  
Approval of various parts of the government was measured using the following 
questions: “Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove with the 
way “the government” has been handling their job lately?”; “Do you strongly approve, 
approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove with the way “the local government” has been 
handling their job lately?”; “Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly 
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disapprove with the way “the Constitutional Court” has been handling their job lately?”; 
“Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove with the way “the 
president” has been handling his/her job lately?”; and “Do you strongly approve, approve, 
disapprove, or strongly disapprove with the way “the National Assembly” has been 
handling their job lately ?” Responses were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly 
approve, 2 = approve, 3 = disapprove, and 4 = strongly disapprove.   
Measuring the people in terms of their negative view of disagreement, their 
political knowledge and their attitude toward government is important because these 
independent variables are empirically related to a belief in different types of democratic 
process. Therefore, I would like to control for these variables in this study.  
Negative view of disagreement will be measured using the following questions: 
“When people argue about political issues, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable.” 
Respondenses were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 
= agree, and 4 = strongly agree. 
The political knowledge index was created by summing up correct responses to 
four factual questions: What job or political office does Park Genu-hye now hold? 1 = A 
former leader of the Grand National Party, 2 = A leader of the Grand National Party, 3 = the 
Prime Minister, 4 = the President; What about Barack Obama? 1 = the President in the US, 
2 = A financial investigator in the US, 3 = GM CEO, 4 = the Governor of Illinois; Who has 
the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not? 1 = the President, 2 = the 
National Assembly, 3 = the Constitutional Court, 4 = the Prime Minister; Which party 
currently has the most members in the National Assembly? 1 = Grand National Party, 2 = 
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Democratic Party, 3 = Liberty Forward Party, 4 = Democratic Labor Party.  
Attitudes toward government were measured using the following questions: “Our 
basic governmental structures are the best and should not be changed in a major way.” “I 
am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced lately.” “Our 
government would work best if it were run like a business.” “The current political system 
does a good job of representing the interests of all Koreans, regardless of socioeconomic 
status and gender.” Respondents were coded from 1 through 4, in which 1 = strongly 
disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree. 
Political participation and activities were measured using the following questions: 
“Did you participate in the last presidential election?” Responses were coded 1 = yes, 2 = 
no. “Have you used the Internet (e.g., e-mail, UCC and blog) to try to inform or persuade 
other people about a political issue important to you in the past two years?” Responses 
were coded 1 = yes, 2 = no. “Have you personally contacted a local or national government 
official about a need, problem or issue in the past two years?” Responses were coded 1 = 
yes, 2 = no. “Have you worked with others in this community to try to solve some 
community problems in past two years?” Responses were coded 1 = yes, 2 = no. “Have you 
participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches in past two years? 
Responses were coded 1 = yes, 2 = no. 
In addition, the last independent variables are political and demographic controls to 
understand variations in support of stealth democracy or different types of democracy.  
Age was coded as reported age. 
Gender was coded 0 = male and 1 = female. 
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Region was coded as follows: Seoul and Kyung-Gi province was coded 1, Choong-
Chung province was coded 2, Kang-Won Province was coded 3, Cholla province was 
coded 4, Kyongsang province was coded 5, and Je-ju province was coded 6. 
Education: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?” Coded 1 
= less than high school, 2 = some high school, 3 = high school graduate, 4 = some technical 
school, 5 = technical school graduate, 6 = some college, 7 = college graduate, 8 = post 
graduate or professional degree. 
Income: “What was your total household income in 2008, before taxes”? 
Responses were coded 1 = less than 20,000,000 Won, 2 = 20,000,000 to less than 
35,000,000 Won, 3 = 35,000,000 to less than 50,000,000 Won, 4 = 50,000,000 to less than 
65,000,000 Won, 5 = 65,000,000 to less than 80,000,000 Won, 6 = over 80,000,000 Won. 
 
3. A Simple Model 
The simple model is: 
Yk = a+b1X1+ b2X2+ b3X3+ b4X4+ …+ biXi+ E.  
The bs are respective regression coefficients.  
Y1= representative democracy, Y2= deliberative democracy, Y3= direct democracy, Y4= 
pure direct democracy and Y5= stealth democracy, X1= South Korea’s policy (especially the 
Sunshine Policy) toward North Korea, X2= Regionalism, X3= Negative view of 
disagreement, X4= Approval of various parts (i.e., the government, the local government, 
the Constitutional Court, president, Congress) of the government, X5= attitude toward 
government, X6= political knowledge, X7= political participation and activities, X8= 
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income, X9= age, X10 = geographical area, X11 = education, and X12= gender.  
 
4. Data Collection 
After approving my dissertation prospectus from the committee, I submitted the survey 
protocol to the Institutional Review Board (IRB). My research project was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) on 27, March 2009. After that, I translated the survey into 
a Korean-version and sent a questionnaire to “MBIZON” to conduct the survey. Data 
gathering took 7 days. The total sample size is 599, with a good distribution of ages, 
regions, and gender.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
As mentioned earlier, the democratic process survey is the main source of data. The 
democratic process survey contains a large random sample (n= 599) gathered in South 
Korea. The survey also includes question on different types of democratic process (i.e., 
pure direct, direct, deliberative, representative, and stealth democracy), two factors (i.e., 
South Korea policy and policy making process toward North Korea and regionalism) 
causing popular dissatisfaction and distrust with government and politicians, other relevant 
variables (e.g., public attitudes toward the overall political system, approval of various parts 
of the government, and political participation and activities) related to individuals’ 
perceptions of types of democratic process, and demographic variables (e.g., education, 
income, gender, and others).  
This chapter is organized into three sections. In general, to what extent are South 
Koreans dissatisfied with their democratic system? To what extent is the people’s approval 
or disapproval of government dependent on how government operates its decision making 
procedures? These questions will be addressed in the first section. 
The second section will discuss what types of democratic process (i.e., pure direct, 
direct, deliberative, or representative democracy) ordinary Koreans really want. For 
example, to what extent do they prefer participatory democracy because they believe 
government and politicians do not conform to their expectations and needs? Or, to what 
extent do ordinary Koreans want a representative democracy because they believe 
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representatives make decisions based on the people’s wishes or on what they think is in the 
people’s best interest? These questions will be addressed in the second section. 
In additions, this section will examine people’s attitudes toward South Korea’s 
policy and policy making process toward North Korea and regionalism. I will focus on 
whether or not these two factors not only are crucially related to ordinary Koreans’ 
dissatisfaction with government and politicians, but also are related to determine ordinary 
Koreans’ preference for a certain type of democracy. To what extent are ordinary Koreans 
interested in political participation and pubic activities in order to show their needs, 
problems, and concerns to government, their community, or politicians? Are there any 
relationships between public activities and support for different types of democratic 
processes? This section will cover these concerns as well. Finally, using binary logistic 
analysis, I will investigate what variables predict the different types of democratic process.  
What kind of democracy do South Koreans really prefer? Do ordinary Koreans 
really prefer a certain type of democracy such as pure direct democracy or representative 
democracy? Or, do they prefer another alternative democracy such as stealth democracy, 
because they not only perceive that politicians tend to be self-serving, dishonest, prone to 
argue, eager to compromise, and conflictual in politics and policy making, but also they 
would like to have a smaller role in the democratic process? I will examine whether or not 
support for stealth democracy can be found in South Korea. Additionally, do they support 
two or more types of democracy at the same time? I will examine this concern in the same 
section as well. Moreover, using OLS regression analysis, I will examine what variables 
predict support for stealth democracy in South Korea. 
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1. South Korean’s attitudes toward their democratic system 
 As bits of evidence suggested earlier, ordinary Koreans appear to be dissatisfied 
with their government and politicians. But are they really dissatisfied? I will examine 
several measures (i.e., public attitudes toward the overall political system and approval of 
various parts of the government) in order to investigate whether or not South Koreans are 
truly dissatisfied and lack faith in their democracy.  
 
1-1. public attitudes toward the overall political system 
As mentioned above, though many scholars and people believe that South Korea is 
one of the most successful third-wave democracies in Asia, little is known about how 
ordinary people perceive the overall political system and their democracy. This section 
focuses on public attitudes toward the overall political system in South Korea. Regarding 
this concern, several questions can be raised.  
For example, how well do ordinary Koreans understand their overall political 
system? And to what extent do ordinary Koreans support their basic governmental 
structures? By drawing on a democratic process survey recently conducted in South Korea, 
I address these questions of how ordinary Koreans evaluate the overall political system. To 
investigate public attitudes toward the overall political system, the respondents were asked: 
1) our basic governmental structures are the best and should not be changed in a major way; 
2) I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced lately; 3) 
our government would work best if it were run like a business; and 4) the current political 
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system does a good job of representing the interests of all Koreans, regardless of 
socioeconomic status and gender. Table 4-1 indicates public attitudes toward the overall 
political system of South Korea. 
 
Table 4-1 Here 
 
As expected, a large number of the respondents believe that the governmental 
structures, the current public policies, and the current political system are far from their 
interests and needs. In particular, 56.2 percent of the respondents said our basic 
governmental structures are not the best and should be changed in a significant way. This 
finding suggests that a majority of the respondents are discontented with their basic 
governmental structures, requesting structural change of government.  
When the respondents were asked about the current public policies, interestingly 
72.9 percent of the respondents said they are dissatisfied with the public policies the 
government has produced lately. This result suggests that a large majority of the 
respondents believe that the public policies often reflect the interests of elected officials and 
politicians rather than ordinary people’s needs and interests (Geddes, 1994: 2). Ordinary 
people tend to be concerned about common problems (e.g., employment, affordable health 
care, getting a good education for their children, and so on) not about big issues such as 
international peace or others. But, they think elected officials and politicians are not deeply 
concerned about what the public really wants. 
When respondents were asked about the current political system, 80.5 percent of 
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the respondents, as expected, said the current political system does a poor job representing 
the interests of all Koreans. Although ordinary people are unable to do away with the 
current political system themselves, they are dissatisfied with the current political system. 
Additionally, 60.1 percent of the respondents do not believe our government would work 
best if it were run like a business despite most of the respondents expressing their 
dissatisfaction and discontent with the overall political system. 
This empirical result implies that ordinary people recognize operating a 
government is different from running a business. In other words, the main purpose of the 
government is to provide public goods, but the crucial objective of business is to earn 
money from the public, recognizing the public as the consumer. Therefore, South Koreans 
still support having a democratic political system even though they are dissatisfied with 
government and the politicians. Moreover, government and politicians should not deal with 
ordinary people as customers, but take care of them as their political partners.  
 
1-2. approval of various parts of the government 
If process matters are significantly related to ordinary people’s dissatisfaction and 
discontent with government and politicians in their democracy, is the people’s approval or 
disapproval of government dependent upon how the government makes decisions with the 
broader democratic structure? If yes, to what extent do ordinary Koreans show a dislike of 
the National Assembly rather than the President due to the National Assembly’s more 
visible decision making procedures? To what extent are ordinary Koreans unlikely to draw 
much on their process frustration when assessing the Constitutional Court rather than the 
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National Assembly because the Constitutional Court’s decision-making procedures are 
hidden from the public eye and vice versa? Drawing on a national sample survey recently 
conducted in South Korea, the present inquiry addresses these questions in an attempt to 
evaluate both the process matters that affect ordinary Koreans’ perceptions of government 
and politicians and the degree of their approval of various parts of the government. To 
measure individuals’ approval of various parts of the government, respondents were asked 
how much they approved of the way: 1) the government has been handling their job lately; 
2) the local government has been handling their job lately; 3) the Constitutional Court has 
been handling their job lately; 4) the president has been handling his/her job lately; and 5) 
the National Assembly has been handling their job lately.  
 
Table 4-2 Here 
 
 Table 4-2 provides the percentage of ordinary Koreans regarding approval of 
various parts of the government. Approximately 61 percent of the respondents did not 
approve of the way the government has been handling their job lately, 65.1 percent of the 
respondents disapproved of the way the local government has been handling their job lately, 
56.3 percent of the respondents disapproved of the way the Constitutional Court has been 
handling their job lately, and 64.3 percent of the respondents disapproved of the way the 
president has been handling his/her job lately. Contrary to my expectation, 52.4 percent of 
the respondents approved of the way the National Assembly has been handling their job 
lately. The National Assembly has consistently been the most favored institution of 
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government.  
These empirical findings are somewhat different from a previous study in the 
United States. According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 99), for example, 72 percent 
of respondents approved of the way that the Supreme Court has been handling their job 
lately, 70 percent of respondents approved of the way that state government has been 
handling their job lately, and 52 percent of the respondents approved of the way the 
Congress has been handling their job lately. Regarding this finding, they argue that “the 
Supreme Court has consistently been the most favored institution of government, and 
Congress the least”, because debates and compromises among the justices are not exposed 
to the public (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 99). Although, there is some degree of 
public willingness to approve of some specific institutions, a majority of the people offer 
approval of the overall political system. By comparing the two different findings between 
the U. S. and South Korea, it can be argued that visual institutional processes to South 
Korea do not affect the public’s willingness to give more approval on some institutions than 
others. Moreover, it seems likely that South Koreans are more dissatisfied with government 
and politicians than Americans are.  
Overall, by looking at two measures of the overall political system and approval of various 
parts of the government, it can be suggested that there is a consistent tendency that most 
ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with government and their democratic system.  
 
2. Types of democratic process that people want 
Keeping to the point, I have argued that a majority of respondents take an airy 
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attitude toward government and their democratic system. I have not yet shown, however, 
what types of democratic process ordinary Koreans prefer, if they believe governmental 
procedures do not match their own preferred procedures. Therefore, I examine types of 
democratic processes that ordinary Koreans really prefer. This section also descriptively 
examines independent variables that might predict type of democracy, discussing why I am 
including the independent variables. Finally, I will examine the hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between dependent variables (i.e., types of democratic processes) and each 
independent variable.  
 
2-1. Different types of democratic processes  
There is no doubt that all democracies, regardless whether they are consolidated or 
consolidating democracies, can not be expected to develop and improve their performance 
without their citizens’ constant support and involvement (e.g., Dalton, 1999, 2008). 
Nevertheless, as I argued earlier, a large majority of ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied and 
discontented with government and democratic procedures because they believe government 
and democratic procedures do not carefully deal with what citizens really want. Regarding 
this concern, what needs to be determined is to find out whether or not ordinary Koreans 
really want to become deeply involved in governmental procedures. For example, ordinary 
people who support elected officials who have attained office by winning contested 
elections prefer representative democracy, because they believe elected officials and 
government might represent their interests and concerns. On the other hand, others who do 
not support elected officials and government and do not like the growth of big government 
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prefer a participatory democracy, because they believe more popular control over 
government spending and greater citizen involvement are necessary for effective political 
outcomes and procedures.  
To address this point, respondents were asked two questions that get at the different 
types of democratic processes that ordinary Koreans might want: 1) if the Korean people 
carefully considered and discussed all political issues instead of relying on politicians to do 
this, the country would be a lot better off; and 2) if the Korean people decided all political 
issues directly in operating their government instead of relying on politicians, the country 
would be a lot better off. To determine the different types of democratic processes that 
ordinary Koreans want, negative response (strongly disagree and disagree) and positive 
responses (agree and strongly disagree) were combined into four categories: 1) if a person 
answers both questions “strongly agree or agree”, it can be said that he/she is a supporter of 
pure direct democracy; 2) if a person answers both questions “disagree or strongly 
disagree”, it can be said that he/she is a supporter of representative democracy; 3) if a 
person answers the first question “disagree or strongly disagree” and the second question 
“strongly agree or agree”, it can be said that he/she may hold direct democracy beliefs; and 
4) if a person answers the first question “strongly agree or agree” and the second question 
“disagree or strongly disagree”, it can be said that he/she may hold deliberative democracy 
beliefs.  
 
Table 4-3 Here 
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Table 4-3 shows a prevalence of different types of democratic processes. Table 4-3 
shows that 57.4 percent and 5.3 percent of the respondents said they prefer pure direct 
democracy or direct democracy respectively. In other words, a large number of respondents 
(62.7 percent) want to be involved in policies and policy making process instead of relying 
on politicians. Of the different types of democratic process, 26 percent (156) of the 
respondents prefer a deliberative democracy. Interestingly, only 11.2 percent (67) of the 
respondents support a representative democracy.  
Unlike previous research that ordinary Americans want a balance of influence between 
elected officials and ordinary people with neither dominating the other (Hibbing and 
Thiess-Morese, 2002: 46), ordinary Koreans tend to prefer a participatory democracy when 
the performance of those regimes falls short of their ideals even though they have little 
experience in democratic politics. These findings suggest that they do not want a balance of 
influence between politicians (e.g., elected officials) and ordinary people. Rather, a large 
majority of ordinary Koreans believe they can solve long-standing political problems 
themselves, not relying on elected officials.  
 
2-2. South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and regionalism 
Understanding public attitudes toward South Korea’s policy toward North Korea 
and regionalism are important because politics is affected by these two major issues and 
these two factors can influence political divisions that may not be observable in any 
countries. Specifically, continuous debate, conflict, and compromise with policy and policy 
making process toward North Korea and political regionalism may have an impact on 
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individuals’ negative attitudes toward government and politicians. Furthermore, it can be 
inferred that these two factors may be related to people’s preference for a certain type of 
democratic process.  
First, to explore public attitudes toward South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, 
I asked several questions: 1) You are satisfied with South Korea’s policy toward North 
Korea; 2) You are satisfied with the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea; 3) When people 
criticize the Sunshine Policy, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable; 4) The Sunshine Policy 
failed to bring about any meaningful changes in North Korean politics; 5) When elected 
officials debate about North Korea, you feel uneasy, uncomfortable, and even angry; and 6) 
There are too many compromises among politicians when discussing and debating the 
policy toward North Korea. 
 
Table 4-4 Here 
 
Table 4-4 shows public attitude toward South Korea’s policy toward North Korea. 
When respondents were asked about South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, 72.3 
percent of the respondents said they are dissatisfied with South Korea’s policy toward 
North Korea. When respondents were asked about the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea, 
there are no considerably distinctive differences. 51.1 percent of the respondents said they 
are satisfied with the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. But, 48.9 percent of the 
respondents did not support the Sunshine Policy. 48.7 percent of the respondents said that 
when people criticize the Sunshine Policy, they feel uneasy and uncomfortable. 55.8 
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percent of the respondents expressed that the Sunshine Policy failed to bring about any 
meaningful changes in North Korean policies. 69.9 percent of the respondents said that 
when elected officials debate about North Korea, they feel uneasy, uncomfortable, and even 
angry. Finally, when respondents were asked if there are too many political compromises 
among politicians when discussing and debating the policy toward North Korea, 63.4 
percent of the respondents said “yes”. 
Many studies provide evidence that people believe that regionalism tends to 
undermine democracy in South Korea. Specifically, ordinary Koreans believe that political 
regionalism produced by elected officials reveals a critical flaw in Korea’s democracy today. 
Regarding the problem of regionalism, to what extent does the regionalism in South Korea 
lead ordinary Koreans to be dissatisfied with and distrustful of government and politicians? 
To analyze public attitude toward regionalism in South Korea, I asked several questions: 1) 
regionalism is a barrier to reviving the nation’s democratic development and stable society; 
2) politicians tend to favor one region over another and manipulate regional biases for their 
political gain; 3) The GNP is more willing to work for the people living in Kyongsang 
provinces than the people living in Cholla provinces; 4) The UDP is more willing to work 
for the people living in Cholla provinces than the people living in Kyongsang provinces; 
and 5) when the GNP and the UDP debate on a certain issue, you feel uneasy and 
uncomfortable. 
 
Table 4-5 Here 
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Table 4-5 shows ordinary Koreans’ attitude toward regionalism in South Korea, 
regarding policy and process matters. In the first question, a large majority of the 
respondents (79.3 percent) recognizes regionalism as a barrier to reviving the nation’s 
democratic development and stability. As I expected, a large number of the respondents 
(89.7 percent) said politicians tend to favor one region over another and manipulate 
regional biases for their political gain. When asked if the GDP is more willing to work for 
the people living in Kyongsang provinces than the people living in Cholla provinces, 72.6 
percent of the respondents agreed. With somewhat same question that if the UDP is more 
willing to work for the people living in Cholla provinces than the people living in 
Kyongsang provinces, 66.8 percent of the respondents agreed. When asked a final question 
“if the GNP and the UDP debate on a certain issue, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable”, 
86.6 percent of the respondents said yes. In general, a large majority of the respondents 
recognize regionalism as a crucial barrier to reviving the nation’s democratic development 
and stable society.  
 
 
2-3. Political participation and activities 
Many political scientists have stressed importance of citizens’ political 
participation and activities in democratic process. Dalton (2008: 77) emphasizes a 
significance of citizens’ political participation, arguing that “elections are important 
because they select political elites, provide a source of democratic legitimacy, and engage 
the mass public in the democratic process.” Olsen (1982:37) argues that “if citizens fail to 
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participate actively in political affairs, they will certainly remain politically powerless.”  
Regarding the importance of citizens’ political participation and activities, an 
interesting task in this section is to examine whether ordinary Koreans are really interested 
in electoral political participation (e.g., general election or presidential election) and other 
political activities such as community action, protest, or others with regard to stable 
democracy. To investigate this concern, I classified public activities into five categories and 
questions: 1) Did you participate in the last presidential election; 2) Have you used the 
Internet (e.g., e-mail, UCC and blog) to try to inform or persuade other people about a 
political issue important to you in the past two years; 3) Have you personally contacted a 
local or national government official about a need, problem or issue in the past two years; 
4) Have you worked with others in this community to try to solve some community 
problems in the past two years;  and 5) Have you participated in any demonstrations, 
protests, boycotts, or marches in the past two years. Table 4-6 shows across these five 
categories the percentages of those who participated in the last presidential election and 
other political activities. 
 
Table 4-6 Here 
As can be seen, a large majority of the respondents, 82.3 percent, participated in the last 
presidential election. While many scholars are concerned about the erosion of citizens’ 
political participation, a large majority of the respondents participated in the last 
presidential election. A small number of the respondents, 24.9 percent, said they used the 
Internet such as e-mail or a blog to try to inform or persuade other people about a political 
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issue. This empirical finding gives us an important idea of how much technological 
development influences individuals’ political involvement. Given the current technological 
development of South Korea, it can be postulated that because most people have a personal 
computer and can use the Internet, they could easily express their interests and needs to 
government and politicians. But, a small number of the respondents have used the Internet 
to try to inform or persuade other people about a political issue.  
An additional interesting finding is that only 15 percent of the respondents said 
they have personally contacted a local or national government official about a need, 
problem or issue. When asked if they had been involved in community action to solve some 
community problems, 22.9 percent of the respondents said yes. Finally, only 15.7 percent of 
the respondents said they have participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or 
marches in the past two years. These empirical findings give us important information that 
most citizens believe that their political activities do not influence the government.  
 
2-4. Binary logistic analysis of types of democracy 
This section explores the connections, if any, between types of democratic 
processes and the independent variables. For example, to what extent do those who 
negatively evaluate regionalism support pure direct democracy? Or, to what extent do those 
who are disappointed by government policy and policy making process toward North Korea 
prefer either participatory or deliberative democracy? Binary logistic analysis is employed 
to address these questions.  
In binary logistic analysis, I include two policy variables (i.e., policy and the policy 
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making process toward North Korea and regionalism) that I already discussed reason for 
including as two independent variables. I include understanding public attitudes toward the 
overall political system, because individuals’ perception of the political system impacts on 
preference for a certain type of democracy. For example, it can be argued that those who 
are dissatisfied with the political system prefer direct democracy rather than representative 
democracy, demanding better political systems. Public approval or disapproval of 
governmental institutions is a good predictor in examining types of democratic processes. 
For instance, those who approve of governmental institutions such as the National 
Assembly or the President prefer representative democratic process. Or, those who 
disapprove of governmental institutions prefer direct democracy. Citizens’ political 
participation and activities is also a good predictor in determining what type of democratic 
processes people prefer. If people want to be actively involved in politics, they support 
direct democratic process. On the other hand, if citizens not only rely on elected officials’ 
decision making process, but also do not want to be deeply involved in politics, they 
support representative democracy. 
Concerning individuals’ preference for democratic process, I will examine the 
hypotheses about what factors and variables are statistically related to individuals’ 
preference on types of democratic process.  
To briefly recap, these hypotheses are: 
H1. Public attitudes toward South Korea’s policy and policy making process toward North 
Korea and types of democratic process:  
H 1-1. The more ordinary Koreans are disappointed by government policy and 
policy making process toward North Korea, the more likely South Koreans will 
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have a preference for either participatory or deliberative democracy. 
H 1-2. There is no relationship between South Korea’s policy toward North Korea 
and ordinary South Koreans’ preference for types of democracy. 
 
H2. Public attitudes toward regionalism and types of democratic processes: 
H 2-1. The more ordinary South Koreans are concerned about political regionalism, 
the more likely South Koreans are to have a preference for either direct or stealth 
democracy.  
H 2-2. The more ordinary Koreans favor with political regionalism, the more likely 
they are to have a preference for representative democracy. 
 
H3. Public attitudes toward the overall political system and types of democratic process: 
H 3-1. The more people are dissatisfied and discontented with the overall political 
system, the more likely ordinary Koreans will have a preference for participatory 
democracy. 
H 3-2. The more people are satisfied and content with the overall political system, 
the more likely ordinary Koreans will support representative democracy. 
 
H4. Approval of various parts of the government and types of democratic process: 
H 4-1. The more people disapprove of the actual workings of government, the 
more they will be likely to support participatory democracy. 
H 4-2. There is no relationship between approval of various parts of the 
government and types of democratic process. 
  
H5. Political participation and activities and types of democratic process: 
H 5-1. The more ordinary Koreans are interested in public activities such as 
community action and protest, the more they support the participatory democratic 
process.  
H 5-2. The more ordinary Koreans are not interested in public activities, the more 
 72
they support the representative democracy.  
 
Table 4-7 Here 
 
Table 4-7 shows the results of binary logistic analysis with regard to the 
relationships between the dependent variables 13  (i.e., pure direct, deliberative, and 
representative democratic process) and each independent variable. First, in pure direct 
democracy, gender, regionalism, negative view of disagreement, e-contacting, and 
contacting are statistically significant. In particular, gender has a strong effect with a 
coefficient of .403. The positive coefficient indicates that female respondents support the 
pure direct democracy, but less so the male respondents. 
Regionalism is statistically significant, having a coefficient of .49. Most 
respondents who dislike regionalism like pure direct democracy. A negative view of 
disagreement at 0.5 level is statistically significant. Given an effect with a coefficient 
of .403, most respondents who feel uneasy and uncomfortable when people argue about 
political issues prefer the pure direct democracy.  
Lastly, another interesting outcome is that e-contacting and contacting is 
statistically significant at 0.1 level. Those who support pure direct democracy have used the 
Internet (e.g., e-mail, UCC and blog) to try to inform or persuade other people about a 
political issue and have personally contacted a local or national government official about a 
need, problem or issue. Contrary to my expectation, none of the variables related to North 
                                            
13 In this analysis I took out direct democratic process due to such a small number of respondents (32) 
supporting this type of democratic process.  
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Korea is statistically significant. Moreover, several independent variables such as public 
attitudes toward overall political system, political knowledge, approval of government, and 
other demographic variables (e.g., education, age, and income) are not statistically 
significant.  
For the deliberative democracy type of process, several interesting outcomes can be 
observed. South Korea’s policy making process toward North Korea is statistically 
significant at 0.1 level. Unlike the pure direct democracy, two independent variables (basic 
governmental structures and public policies) both at 0.01 and 0.05 level in attitudes toward 
government are statistically significant.  
Basic governmental structures have an effect with a coefficient of -.32. Because the 
coefficient is negative, it can be interpreted that those who are dissatisfied with basic 
governmental structures support the deliberative democratic process. Additionally, 
evaluation of the public policies the government has produced lately has an effect with a 
coefficient of .44. Those who are satisfied with the current public policies prefer the 
deliberative democracy rather than other types of democratic processes.  
Moreover, public activities (i.e., e-contacting and contacting) are also significant. 
Because the coefficients of e-contacting (-.625) and contacting (-.562) are negative, it can 
be interpreted that respondents who do not actively participate in public activities, 
especially e-contacting and contacting, prefer the deliberative democratic process. Given a 
crucial principle of deliberative democracy, this statistical result is illogical as to why those 
who support deliberative democratic process are less willing to be involved in public 
activities. Despite the fact that most respondents who prefer a deliberative democratic 
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process believe the process of deliberation is important because it allows citizens to engage 
among themselves in an exchange of ideas and views on political matters, to reshape and 
solidify their preferences, and to reduce the number of alternatives before making a 
decision about a certain issue, they are in doubt about how much their voices influence 
policy and the policy making process. That is why it can be carefully concluded that they 
like the deliberative democratic process. 
For representative democracy, several interesting outcomes can be observed also. 
Gender has an effect with a coefficient of -.6. The negative coefficient indicates that more 
male respondents support the representative democracy, than female respondents. The 
Sunshine Policy has a strong effect with a coefficient of -1.13. The negative coefficient 
implies that those who do not support the Sunshine policy have a preference for 
representative democratic process. Regionalism at 0.01 level is statistically significant. And, 
the regionalism has a strong effect with a coefficient of -1.9. Because the coefficient is 
negative, it can be interpreted that those who positively evaluate regionalism have a 
preference for a representative democratic process. Additionally, the final independent 
variables such as political system, negative view of disagreement, or political activities are 
not statistically significant.  
In hypothesis testing, the first hypothesis that “ordinary Koreans who are 
disappointed by government policy making process toward North Korea will have a 
preference for either participatory or deliberative democracy” is supported. Especially, 
those who are disappointed by government policy making process toward North Korea 
support deliberative democracy. Given that deliberative democracy emphasizes rational 
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dialogue and consensus formation among individuals (Gupte et al., 2007: 95), most people 
who support the deliberative democracy believe government and politicians should be wary 
of debating and discussing in policy making process toward North Korea. They also expect 
that rational dialogue and consensus decision making lead to a proper outcome.  
The second hypothesis that “ordinary Koreans who are concerned about political 
regionalism prefer direct democracy” is also supported. Most people believe that political 
regionalism refers to political antagonism among regions. They also believe Korean 
democracy will be aggravated by political regionalism. This finding provides a somewhat 
interesting point that people believe direct democracy may reduce political regionalism in 
South Korea. Conversely, those who positively evaluate regionalism support the 
representative democracy. They believe that political regionalism is not the main factor 
leading to regional economic gaps and political antagonisms among elected officials and 
others.  
The third hypothesis about relationship between the public attitudes toward the 
overall political system and types of democratic process is not supported. The fourth 
hypothesis that those who disapprove of the actual workings of government support 
participatory democracy is not support. Rather, the null hypothesis, that there is no 
relationship between approval of various parts of the government and types of democratic 
process, is supported.  
The final hypothesis that those who support the participatory democratic process 
are interested in public activities is supported. People who support direct democracy 
believe that all citizens should participate equally in public decision making and should 
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exercise relatively equal amount of influence in the political system. And, they suppose that 
public participation will lead to be strength of South Korea political system. In a nutshell, 
South Korea’s policies, especially the Sunshine Policy, and policy making process toward 
North Korea and regionalism are the main factors that determine types of democratic 
process that ordinary Koreans really prefer.  
According to the empirical findings, South Koreans are unhappy with their 
democracy and they widely prefer direct democracy. They want to be more active and to 
have more input. However, some scholars argue that the current political environment of 
South Korea tends to discourage ordinary Koreans from actively participating in the 
political decision making process (Im, 2006). Given the political environment in South 
Korea, another task I have to investigate is whether or not ordinary Koreans really want to 
be deeply involved in politics and the policy making process. Or, do they prefer other types 
of democratic process? The research on stealth democracy suggests another alternative that 
we have not explored yet. To what extent might South Koreans, like many Americans, 
prefer the only marginally democratic stealth democracy? Or, to what extent do they 
eagerly embrace stealth democracy? Regarding these questions, I will discus the stealth 
democracy in the next section.  
 
3. Stealth Democracy 
As is apparent from the evidence presented in the previous section, surprisingly 
many people prefer the participatory democratic process, especially pure direct democracy. 
Given the evidence, it can be inferred that a large number of ordinary Koreans want to 
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empower ordinary people because they believe they would do a better job considering 
political issues and making political decisions than elites. Although it is somewhat true that 
ordinary people want to give political power to their fellow citizens or themselves, at the 
same time it is necessary to understand whether the people really would prefer to be deeply 
involved in political considerations and decisions instead of political elites in South Korea. 
Additionally, it is interesting to examine if their most earnest political goal is to get power 
away from self-serving politicians.  
Using focus groups and a nation-wide survey, John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse (2002: 130) disputed the conventional wisdom that people want to shift power to the 
people in considering political issues and making political decisions, arguing that 
empowering ordinary people is a populist instinct. Rather, ordinary people would prefer 
stealth democracy: people want government that is run by non-self-interested decision 
makers (ENSIDs) so they do not need to pay attention to politics. This study gives 
somewhat interesting information that people want to have a limited role in politics. 
Regarding the finding, I will examine whether ordinary Koreans also support stealth 
democracy as an alternative democracy in South Korea.  
 
3-1. The public’s beliefs about debate and compromise 
Before discussing beliefs in stealth democracy in South Korea, it would be better to 
examine whether ordinary Koreans dislike political debates, compromise, and conflict in 
the policy making process if process matters are important. Additionally, it can be inferred 
that if ordinary Koreans are uncomfortable with political debate, compromise, and conflict 
 78
in the policy making processes, they may support stealth democracy. To test the public’s 
beliefs about conflict, debate and compromise, respondents were asked two questions: 1) 
“Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take 
action on important problems”; and 2) “What people call compromise is really just selling 
out one’s principles.” Responses are reported in Table 4-8.  
 
Table 4-8 Here 
  
 As can be seen, a large majority of respondents, 90.1 percent, overwhelmingly 
preferred “stopping meaningless political debate and conflict.” Ordinary Koreans not only 
are somewhat anti-debate, but also really expect elected officials to take political action. 
Unlike past research, a smaller number of respondents (42.7 percent) said “compromise is 
selling out one’s principles.” 
 
3-2. Public attitudes toward less democratic arrangements  
 From the result that a large majority of the respondents dislike elected officials’ 
worthless debates and conflicts, it is obvious that the public believes current elected 
officials and other politicians are self-serving with less consideration of the public’s 
concerns. If this argument is true, are ordinary people fond of nondemocratic decision-
making structures? To be sure, three items are employed: 1) our government would run 
better if decisions were left up to successful business people; 2) our government would run 
better if decisions were left up to nonelected, independent experts rather than politicians or 
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the people; and 3) our government would work best if it were run like a business (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 138).  
 
Table 4-9 Here 
 
Table 4-9 indicates ordinary Koreans’ attitudes toward less democratic 
arrangements. Unlike conjectural expectation, nearly one-third of the respondent agreed 
that the political system would be better “if decisions were left to successful business 
people.” Interestingly, 70.9 percent of respondents agreed that decisions should be left up to 
nonelected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people. Finally, when asked 
the question “our government would work best if it were run like a business,” 39.9 percent 
of the respondents agreed. Unlike research in the U. S. study that a large majority of the 
respondents (60 percent) prefer government operations running like a business (Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morese, 2002: 138), relatively small number of Korean respondents prefer 
having governmental operation run like a business.  
 
3-3. Prevalence of stealth democratic characteristics 
Based on the results, I argue that most of South Koreans not only dislike debate, 
compromise, and conflict, but also support the nondemocatic decision-making structures. 
Especially, they want government that is run by non-self-interested decision makers. 
Therefore, it can be argued that belief in stealth democracy is observable in South Korea.14 
                                            
14 According to Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 143), “in a stealth democracy, governmental procedures 
are not visible to people unless they go looking; the people do not routinely play an active role in making 
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I will examine whether ordinary Koreans support stealth democracy.  
To measure stealth democracy, respondents were asked: 1) “elected officials would help the 
country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems”; 2) 
“what people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles”; and 
3) “our government would run better if decisions were left up to nonelected, independent 
experts rather than politicians or the people” or “our government would run better if 
decisions were left up to successful business people.” 
 
Table 4-10 Here 
 
Table 4-10 indicates the distribution of people on these measures. Surprisingly only 
3.5 percent (21) of the national survey respondents are completely devoid of stealth 
democratic attitudes. Only 16.2 percent (97) of the respondents in national survey hold only 
one stealth democratic attitudes and 36.5 percent (220) of the respondents hold two stealth 
democratic beliefs. Interestingly, 43.5 percent (261) of the respondent hold all three stealth 
democratic attitudes. Given the distribution of people on stealth democracy attitudes, as 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 144) argued, it can be suggested that Koreans’ support 
for standard features of democracy such as deliberation, compromise, and accountability 
are substantially more tepid than is usually imagined.  
 
3-4. Preference for stealth democratic characteristics and types of democracy 
                                                                                                                                     
decisions, in providing input to decision makers, or in monitoring decision makers. The goal in stealth 
democracy is for decisions to be made efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagreement.” 
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Unlike previous research that ordinary Americans want a balance of influence 
between elected officials and ordinary people with neither dominating the other (Hibbing 
and Thiess-Morese, 2002: 46), I have tried to prove that ordinary Koreans tend to prefer a 
participatory democracy when the performance of those regimes falls short of their ideals 
even though they have little experience in democratic politics. These findings suggest that 
they do not want a balance of influence between politicians (e.g., elected officials) and 
ordinary people. Rather, a large majority of ordinary Koreans want to make political 
decisions themselves, not relying on elected officials.  
One the other hand, I have tried to demonstrate that people tend to prefer an 
alternative democracy, which is stealth democracy. Supporting stealth democracy mean that 
people want to turn political matters over to somebody else because they do not want to be 
involved in politics themselves, but they do not want to turn decision making over to 
someone who is prone to act in a selfish manner. Rather, people would prefer decisions to 
be made by non-self-interested decision makers.  
Regarding these two different findings, I predict that people only prefer direct 
democracy, because they may not want to wait for an election and instead they occasionally 
participate in policy making process in order for them to debate and to decide a certain 
matter themselves. Or, others may prefer both direct democracy and stealth democracy, 
because they want to become deeply involve in politics, but they do not want to have the 
burden of political participation due to individual tasks such as taking care of family or 
others. Or, others may prefer both deliberative democracy and stealth democracy, 
requesting limited political power between the people and elected officials. Regarding these 
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concerns, another problem remains to be solved. Therefore, I will examine using the 
crosstabs analysis whether ordinary Koreans prefer a certain type of democracy or support 
two or more types of democracy at the same time.  
 
Table 4-11 Here 
 
Table 4-11 provides the percentage of the respondents who support both a type of 
democratic process and stealth democracy. Surprisingly, 57.4 percent of the respondents 
who support pure direct democracy also prefer stealth democracy. Contrary to my 
expectation, only 26 percent of the respondents who prefer representative democracy also 
prefer stealth democracy. Additionally, 11.2 percent the respondents who prefer deliberative 
democratic process also prefer stealth democracy.  
Regarding this empirical result, a crucial question can be raised as to why a large 
number of the respondents favor both the pure direct democratic process and the stealth 
democratic process despite the fact that these two democratic processes have fundamentally 
different principles. As mentioned earlier, the fundamental purpose of the pure direct 
democratic process is “if the Korean people carefully considered and discussed as well as 
decided all political issues instead of relying on politicians to do this, the country would be 
a lot better off.” On the other hand, the primary purpose of stealth democratic process is 
“people want government that is run by non-self-interested decision makers (ENSIDs) so 
they do not need to pay attention to politics.”  
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3-5. OLS regression analysis of stealth democracy 
In this section I will examine what variables are statistically related to the beliefs in 
stealth democracy in South Korea. For example, is regionalism statistically related to 
stealth democracy, because people believe that political regionalism shapes politicians’ 
political strategies in policy making process? Additionally, to what extent is South Korea’s 
policy making process toward North Korea a good predictor in explaining individual’s 
preference for stealth democracy? To test these concerns, I conducted a regression analysis 
with the same independent variables.  
 
To briefly recap, these hypotheses are: 
H1. Public attitudes toward South Korea’s policy and policy making process toward North 
Korea and stealth democratic process: 
H 1-1. The more ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied by government policy and the 
policy making process toward North Korea, the more likely ordinary Koreans will 
have a preference for stealth democracy. 
H 1-2. There is no relationship between South Korea’s policy toward North Korea 
 and ordinary South Koreans’ preference for stealth democracy. 
 
H2. Public attitudes toward regionalism and stealth democratic process: 
H 2-1. The more ordinary Koreans are concerned about political regionalism, the 
more likely they are to have a preference for stealth democracy. 
H 2-2. There is no relationship between political regionalism and ordinary 
Koreans’ preference for stealth democracy. 
 
H3. Public attitudes toward the overall political system and stealth democratic process: 
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H 3-1. The more people are dissatisfied and discontented with the overall political 
system, the more likely ordinary Koreans will have a preference for stealth 
democracy. 
H 3-2. There is no relationship between the overall political system and ordinary 
Koreans’ preference for stealth democracy. 
 
H4. Approval of various parts of the government and stealth democratic process: 
H 4-1. The more people disapprove of the actual workings of government, the 
more they will be likely to support stealth democracy. 
H 4-2. There is no relationship between approval of various parts of the 
government and ordinary Koreans’ preference for stealth democracy. 
 
H5. Political participation and activities and stealth democratic process: 
H 5-1. The more ordinary Koreans are interested in public activities such as 
community action and protest, the less they support stealth democratic process.  
H 5-2. There is no relationship between political participation and activities and 
ordinary Koreans’ preference for stealth democracy.  
 
Table 4-12 Here 
 
 Table 4-12 shows the results of an OLS regression analysis. The dependent variable 
of the OLS regression analysis is support for stealth democracy. In general, age, types of 
democratic processes, Sunshine policy toward North Korea, South Korea policy making 
process toward North Korea, regionalism, basic governmental structure, and governmental 
operation running like business are all statistically significant.  
In particular, older respondents support stealth democracy. Types of democratic 
process are statistically significant at 0.001 level. Those who prefer pure direct democracy 
 85
also prefer stealth democracy. Engagement policy toward North Korea has an effect as well. 
Those who are dissatisfied with the Sunshine Policy with North Korea support stealth 
democracy. South Korea’s policy making process toward North Korea is statistically 
significant at 0.05 level. Those who feel uneasy, uncomfortable, and even angry when 
elected officials debate about North Korea prefer stealth democracy. Regionalism is 
statistically significant at 0.05 level. Those who recognize longstanding regionalism of 
South Korea as a critical barrier to the nation’s political development and stable society 
support the beliefs of stealth democracy. Basic governmental structures is statistically 
significant at the .001 level. Interestingly, those who are relatively satisfied with basic 
governmental structures support stealth democracy. A nondemocratic decision-making 
structure, especially government to be run like a business, is statistically significant at .001 
level. Interestingly, those who believe the government would work best if it were run like a 
business support stealth democracy.  
South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, a negative view of disagreement, and e-
contacting are not statistically significant. Unlike my expectation, the coefficient for South 
Korea’s policy toward North Korea’s effect on stealth democracy is statistically 
insignificant. Approval of various parts of the government (i.e., the local government, the 
government, the president, the Constitutional Court, and the National Assembly) do not 
predict stealth democracy as much as individuals’ attitudes toward government. Statistically, 
political participation and activities are not significant. Given the basic ideas of stealth 
democracy, there is less need for ordinary people to participate in public activities so as to 
make the status quo better. Finally, demographic variables, except age, and political 
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ideology do not predict stealth democracy.  
In types of democratic processes that people really want, most of the people 
support direct democracy, while support for stealth democracy can also clearly be seen in 
South Korea. Especially, OLS regression shows that the people who support pure direct 
democracy are much more likely to support stealth than those who have other preferences. 
Why do the people prefer both pure direct and stealth democracy at the same time although 
the main ideas are totally different? Pure direct democracy demands active engagement in 
democratic process whereas the main idea of stealth democracy is that people would like to 
have a smaller role in democratic process. This is a interesting puzzle that I have to solve.  
According to the above findings (e.g., public attitudes toward the overall political 
systems, policy and policy making process toward North Korea, regionalism and others), 
most people believe that the current policies and policy making processes from government 
and politicians did not conform to ordinary people’s expectation and needs. Therefore, 
Koreans are not pleased with political elites and their democracy. These findings reflect 
Koreans’ desire to have more opportunities to be involved in the political process. On the 
other hand, according to the finding in stealth democracy, although citizens believe that 
politics is messy, bureaucratic, and professional, they do not want to be involved in politics 
because they are uninformed and have less political experiences. That is why they believe 
decision making should be made by the elites who are informed and non-self-interested 
decision makers (ENSIDs).  
In light of this result, it can be argued that the reason for the public support of both 
pure direct democratic process and stealth democracy is they are dissatisfied and 
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discontented with government and politicians, and they want to be deeply involved in the 
policies and policy making processes themselves. But, they perceive that ordinary people’s 
political participations are wishful thinking, acknowledging that they are uninformed and 
have less political experiences. And, ordinary people believe they do not have enough time 
to make decisions about important political issues. They are more interested in personal 
tasks such as taking care of family than politics. Therefore, they prefer stealth democracy, 
expecting that political decisions should be made by non-self-interested decision makers. 
In hypotheses testing, the first hypothesis that “ordinary Koreans who are 
dissatisfied by government policy making process toward North Korea have a preference 
for stealth democracy” is supported. This finding gives the interesting point that they 
believe there are too many compromises among politicians when discussing and debating in 
policy making process toward North Korea. They believe too much debating, conflict, and 
compromise are equated with an absence of productivity. Moreover, they believe that when 
discussing and making policy toward North Korea, political elites are selfish. Ordinary 
Koreans want elected officials to stop debating and start taking action on important 
problems. 
The second hypothesis that “ordinary Koreans who are concerned about political 
regionalism prefer stealth democracy” is supported. Most respondents think most political 
parties, regardless of whether it is the ruling or opposition parties, intend to deal with 
regionalism in their political strategies to take extreme positions. Additionally, most 
respondents believe the GNP and the UDP are prone to debate, conflict, and compromise in 
policy making process with regard to a certain region. For example, they believe that the 
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GNP is more willing to work for the people living in Kyongsang provinces than the people 
living in Cholla provinces.  
The third hypothesis that “ordinary Koreans who are dissatisfied and discontented 
with the overall political systems prefer stealth democracy” is also supported. Especially, 
those who believe that our basic governmental structures are the best and should not be 
changed in a major way” prefer stealth democracy. This finding suggests that most people 
supporting stealth democracy support their basic governmental structures, but dislike 
continuous political debates, conflicts, and compromises among politicians. This result 
suggests that “people want to distance themselves from government not because of a 
system defect but because many people are simply averse to political conflict and many 
others believe political conflict is unnecessary and an indication that something is wrong 
with governmental procedures” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morese, 2002: 7).”  
Moreover, those who believe that our government would be better if it were run 
like a business prefer stealth democracy. Regarding this result, a crucial question can be 
raised why most respondents supporting stealth democratic process prefer the government 
to be run like a business. Most people likely believe that many of the administration’s new 
policies may become effective if government were run like a business. As Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2002: 139) argued, “the concept of a smoothly running, directed, 
coordinated entity, moving with the efficiency demanded by market competition, may be so 
attractive to people that they respond in the affirmative without taking into consideration 
that the decision-making processes of most businesses are not accurately described as 
democratic.” Two additional variables, the relationship between approval of various parts of 
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government and stealth democracy and the relationship between political participation and 
activities and stealth democracy, are not supported.  
In summary, the democratic process in South Korea can survive and thrive only 
when citizens remain supportive of democratic rule even if and when their economy, their 
government, and their regime fail to satisfactorily resolve the problems facing their society 
(Shin et al., 2005: 215). Another empirical result provides some evidences that a large 
majority refuses to support government and politicians fully when the government and the 
democratic regime are not functioning to their satisfaction. In rejecting the representative 
process fully, this empirical evidence clearly represents that the Korean people tend to 
support either participatory or stealth democratic processes when they are dissatisfied with 
government and politicians.  
The results of the OLS analysis are that age, engagement policy toward North 
Korea, policy making process toward North Korea, regionalism, basic governmental 
structures, and governmental operation running like a business are statistically significant. 
Especially, according to these findings, two factors, South Korea’s policy toward North 
Korea and regionalism, are good predictors in determining stealth democracy. 
Consequently, given the comparison between types of governmental process and stealth 
democracy, it can be argued that preferring the participatory and stealth democracy of 
ordinary Koreans is “often connected to resentment, dissatisfaction, and puzzlement rather 
than to legitimacy, trust, and enlightenment” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morese, 2002:10).  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This final chapter is organized into four sections which include an overall 
discussion of the results, significance of the study and recommendations to politicians and 
ordinary Koreans, limitations of the study and suggestions for further study and final 
thought. The first section will discuss the main concerns of this study, and answers the 
basic questions: 1) are South Koreans dissatisfied with their democracy?; 2) what kind of 
democracy do they want?; and 3) how do regionalism and North Korea policies effect this 
preference? The second section will discuss some important implications and 
recommendations for the health of Korean democracy, including the significance of this 
study. The third section will address some limitations of this study, focusing on research 
methods, data collection, etc. as well as ideas for further study. Finally, I will end my 
conclusion chapter on a positive note, discussing why my dissertation is interesting.  
 
1. Overall discussion 
As mentioned above, many scholars argue that South Korea has been one of the 
most successful democracies in Asia. Additionally, the economy has developed at an 
incredible rate in the last half-century. Therefore, it can be inferred that citizens should be 
happy with the government in general. As demonstrated by this dissertation, however, 
evidence shows that ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with government and politicians as 
well as the government’s recent policy outputs. If this is true, why are ordinary people 
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distrustful of and dissatisfied with the government and politicians? In recent decades, both 
policy and process matters have increasingly been questioned, in light of the public’s 
negative attitude toward government and politicians and regarding what it is that the people 
really prefer.  
From different standpoints, conventional wisdom stresses policy as the cause for 
ordinary people’s dissatisfaction with and distrust of government and politicians. For 
example, people believe that particular policies such as employment and education lead 
ordinary people to increasingly have negative attitudes toward government and politicians 
when these policies the government produced recently did not take care of what the public 
really wants. One the other hand, some scholars insist that ordinary people’s dissatisfaction 
with and distrust of government and politicians are a reflection of the process performance 
of politicians and government, arguing, for instance, that “political scientists should not 
place policy at the center of the public’s political universe” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2002: 13). Rather, people care deeply about process matters instead of policy matters 
because process concerns, for example, can help us better understand dissatisfaction with 
and distrust of government and politicians (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002: 13-4).  
Process concerns are able to explain the variation in people’s perception of 
government and politicians in South Korea. Additionally, understanding people’s process 
preferences helps solve several issues, including why ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with 
government and politicians, why they want to be directly involved in policy and the policy 
making process, or why they believe the government is not responsive to their interests and 
wishes. To investigate what people would want concerning the democratic process, I not 
 92
only theoretically examined five different types of processes (i.e., representative, 
deliberative, direct, pure direct or stealth democracy), but also I empirically tested what 
type of democratic processes ordinary Koreans really prefer. These questions regarding the 
types of democratic processes and factors influencing South Koreans’ preference for type of 
democracy occupy a central place in this dissertation.  
First, I focus on whether South Koreans are dissatisfied with their democracy by 
asking respondents about some important points (i.e., the overall political system and 
approval of various parts of the government). These empirical findings support the previous 
evidence that a large majority of ordinary citizens are dissatisfied with the government, 
public policies, and the current political system (Jun and Kim, 2002; Lee et al., 2001; Shin 
et al., 2005). Moreover, most ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with their democratic 
system. For example, a large majority of people said the current political system does not 
do a good job representing the interests of all Koreans. Additionally, most people are 
dissatisfied with the current political system, requesting a major change of the system in 
South Korea.  
Based on the two measures (i.e., the overall political system and approval of 
various parts of the government), I argue that most people are dissatisfied with their 
democracy. If this finding is true, what kind of democracy do they want? I locate my work 
within the context of the types of democratic process. Building normatively on Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse’s notion of democratic procedures, I empirically investigated what types of 
democratic process people really want. Based on the democratic process survey, I observed 
several interesting findings. First of all, most respondents (57.4 percent) have a preference 
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for a pure direct democracy rather than other types of democratic process. Surprisingly, 
only a small number of respondents (11.2 percent) prefer representative democracy. This 
finding suggests that most people want to engage in direct and wide-scale action in politics 
and policy making, in order to effect political outcomes and procedures (Donovan and Karp, 
2006). In other words, they believe that government and elected officials might not 
represent their interests and concerns.  
Why do most people prefer the pure direct democracy rather than other type of 
democracy and what variables influence ordinary people’s preference for a certain type of 
democracy? Regarding these concerns, I examine two factors that not only have an impact 
on individual’s negative attitudes toward government and politicians but also might affect 
people’s preference for a certain type of democratic process. Conventional wisdom has 
continuously criticized cultural and political regionalism and South Korea’s policy and the 
policy making process toward North Korea. Many scholars have argued that these two 
features have led ordinary Koreans to experience dissatisfaction with and distrust of 
government and politicians (e.g., Jim, 2008; Kim, 1990; Korea Gallup, 2005, 2008; Kwon, 
2004). Regarding this concern, I investigate whether they are really dissatisfied with 
government and politicians with regard to those two features. Using a nation-wide survey, 
my empirical findings support the previous studies that the two issues heavily influence 
ordinary Koreans’ negative view of government and politicians. 
But, past studies did not support whether the two factors are significantly related to 
people’s preference for a certain type of democratic process in South Korea. Using binary 
logistic analysis, I examine the relationship. The binary logistic analysis clearly shows that 
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political regionalism is a major cause of public disaffection and drives ordinary Koreans 
support for direct democracy. Additionally, government policy making process toward 
North Korea is also a good predictor in determining people’s preference for deliberative 
democracy. This finding suggests that sufficient discussion and consideration among 
elected officials and people with regard to a certain issue (e.g., the Sunshine Policy toward 
North Korea) could lead to people being happier with government. In a nutshell, most 
people have recognized the two features, South Korea’s policy and policy making process 
toward North Korea and regionalism, as obstacles to the evolving democracy in South 
Korea. Additionally, public activities such as e-contacting and contacting are good 
predictors that determine direct democracy in South Korea. By now I have argued that 
South Koreans are unhappy with their democracy and empirical findings show that they 
widely prefer direct democracy.  
I next explored whether ordinary Koreans really prefer direct democracy or if they 
prefer another alternative democracy, one in which they have a marginal role in policies and 
the policy making process. Regarding this concern, I apply the concept of stealth 
democracy, as described by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, to South Korea, focusing on 
whether stealth democracy is observable in South Korea. With the democratic process 
survey, empirical findings support that most people not only dislike debate, compromise, 
and conflict in politics but also support stealth democracy. Ironically, the empirical finding 
provides interesting information that a large majority of people prefer both direct 
democracy and stealth democracy although these two types of democracy are totally 
different in terms of fundamental ideas. Based on the finding in chapter 4, I argue that 
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preferring both a pure direct democracy and stealth democracy at the same time means 
ordinary Koreans do not want to be lazy Koreans, but rather they want to engage with 
politicians who have political knowledge and are non-self-interested decision makers.  
I support empirically that most people prefer stealth democracy, and investigate the 
factors that influence their preference for stealth democracy. Using OLS regression analysis, 
I examine what variables are statistically related to a belief in stealth democracy in South 
Korea. OLS regression analysis provides significant information that the policy making 
process and engagement policy toward North Korea and regionalism are major causes of 
public disaffection and drive their support for stealth democracy. In particular, those who 
prefer stealth democracy feel that too much debate, conflict, and compromise with regard to 
North Korea drive an inappropriate outcome. Additionally, people supporting stealth 
democracy worry about regionalism, believing that elected officials’ continuous debate, 
conflict, and compromise in the policy making process with regard to a certain region 
deteriorates the legitimacy of the political system in South Korea.  
 
2. Significance of the Study and recommendations 
Previous studies have focused on policy matters that effect people’s dissatisfaction 
with and distrust of government and politicians. Although I do not even put a policy 
explanation against a process explanation, this dissertation intends to disabuse elected 
officials of the misperception that people’s dissatisfaction with and distrust of government 
and politicians are caused by policy matters. My dissertation empirically provides a crucial 
point that ordinary Koreans are dissatisfied with government and politicians due to process 
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matters (Im, 2006).  
Many scholars argue that ordinary people really want to participate in democratic 
processes that promote direct contact with government and politicians in order for them to 
present their policy proposals and even decide their policy proposals themselves. Yet, no 
political scientists in South Korea have empirically explored whether ordinary Koreans 
want to participate in the democratic process to directly represent their desires and concerns. 
In my dissertation, I support that there is a relationship between ordinary people’s 
discontent with their government and politicians and their preference for a certain type of 
democracy. The empirical finding provides interesting evidence that those who are 
dissatisfied with government and politicians prefer direct democracy (Donovan and Karp, 
2006). This empirical finding gives crucial information to government and elected officials 
concerned about ordinary Koreans’ distrust and dissatisfaction with government and 
politicians.  
This dissertation empirically and theoretically introduces the beliefs of stealth 
democracy to students of political science in South Korea, focusing on why this belief is 
important. This task is, indeed, unprecedented. This work attaches the importance of stealth 
democracy to political scientists concerns about ordinary Koreans’ dissatisfaction with and 
distrust of government and politicians, focusing on a complete picture of people’s preferred 
type of government. Additionally, this study gives some comments to political scientists 
who are concerned that South Korean democracy is at risk. As Dalton pointed out (2008: 
161), “several leading political scientists are worried about the public’s decreasing civic 
engagement, declining political participation, and growing alienation from the democratic 
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process.” Current democratic processes in South Korea do not stimulate ordinary Koreans 
to participate in the political process. Employing a national survey, this dissertation 
identifies the specific governmental procedures that ordinary Koreans really want by 
looking at some diverse types of the democratic processes. The empirical finding regarding 
the types of democratic processes clearly indicates that ordinary people have a preference 
for both a direct democratic process and stealth democracy. This study has uncovered more 
information about the importance concerning the depth of ordinary people’s distrust of 
government and elected officials.  
Not surprisingly, scholars of Korean politics and society have widely studied 
individual attitudes toward North Korea policy such as engagement policy (e.g., Chae and 
Kim, 2008; Jim, 2008; Levin and Han, 2002) and political regionalism that has brought a 
variety of political ramifications to Korean politics (e.g., Kim, 1987; Kim, 1990; Kwon, 
2004; Moon, 2005). They argue that these two features have led ordinary Koreans to 
exprience dissatisfaction with and distrust of government and politicians (e.g., Jim, 2008; 
Kim, 1990; Korea Gallup, 2005, 2008; Kwon, 2004). Furthermore, these two features in 
South Korea are considered to be the most serious impediments hindering political 
development (Choi, 1998). As I mentioned earlier, little previous study, however, talks 
about how much these features influence South Koreans’ preference for a certain type of 
democracy. Empirical evidence provides interesting information that those who are 
dissatisfied with the policy and policy making process toward North Korea prefer stealth 
democracy. Additionally, most people who have a negative view towards regionalism 
support both direct and stealth democracy in South Korea. If these factors are major 
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problems for successful democracy in South Korea, what can be done to solve the problem?  
Regarding the policy making process impacting Koreans’ dissatisfaction and 
discontent with government and politicians, my dissertation gives some comments to 
government officials, politicians, and ordinary people worried about the future of 
democracy in South Korea. Policy making is how the government decides what will be 
done about a certain matter (Ripley and Franklin, 1991: 81), but policy making at the 
national level is complicated, because the policy making involves a process of interaction 
among a variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors. For example, when 
governmental actors such as elected officials discuss a certain matter (e.g., North Korea), 
most Koreans have observed too much of the debate and conflicts among the elected 
officials. Therefore, most Koreans, as the empirical evidence consistently indicated, are 
dissatisfied with elected officials’ debate, conflict, and compromise and thus ordinary 
people are not only angry but also support stealth democracy.  
The core of the South Korean national governmental policy process is located in 
the National Assembly and the executive branch. But, these public institutional entities and 
actors should periodically and systematically be supplemented by nongovernmental 
institutions and citizens in order for elected officials to reduce the political conflict and 
make better decisions. As a solution, governance structures should be designed by ordinary 
people to encourage participation in policy making in any effective way. Additionally, 
government and politicians have to enhance opportunities for citizens to become involved 
in national government and local governments to address issues they care about (Macedo et 
al., 2008: 114).  
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This study also gives some suggestions to ordinary people who are unwilling to be 
deeply involved in governmental procedures. Good citizens should not be lazy. Rather, 
good citizens are engaged in a variety of social and political activities beyond elections, 
continuously maintaining citizen duties, such as participating in elections, paying taxes, 
obeying the law, and supporting the government (Dalton, 2008: 164). As conventional 
wisdom suggests, ordinary people should voice their opinions and concerns in the proper 
way to the government and politicians without any violent activities. Additionally, 
improving democratic processes in South Korea requires citizens’ acquisition of political 
knowledge. As Macedo and his colleagues (2005: 32) emphasized, “people who know more 
about politics are more actively engaged in it: those with a higher level of political 
knowledge are more likely to engage in every type of political activity.” In summary, the 
government and politicians in the political process should be routinely and necessarily 
responsive to what citizens want. Proper participation of ordinary people in the policy 
making process will reduce their negative attitude toward government and politicians and 
lead to better decision-making.  
As indicated above, I argue that regionalism is one of the most notable features 
influencing people’s preference for a certain type of democracy and causing people’s 
dissatisfaction with government and politicians. Why does regionalism affect individual 
preference for a certain type of democracy and lead to their negative view toward 
government and elected officials? Is there any solution to reduce regionalism and to better 
develop democracy in South Korea?  
Based on my empirical findings, I suggest some points to reduce longstanding 
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regionalism in South Korea. As I indicated in chapters 1 and 3, though South Korea may be 
ethnically homogeneous, regionalism has historically divided the electorate along 
geographical lines between Kyongsang in the south-east and the Cholla region in the south 
west. Because whole regional populations of Kyonsang provinces are bigger than Cholla 
provinces, most of the presidents and ruling parties came from Kyongsang provinces. This 
political environment has led to unbalanced economic development. Therefore, most people 
believe that the citizens of Kyongsan provinces have relative advantages in various 
economic and political benefits under their rule (Kim, 1987; Kim, 1997). The citizens’ 
negative perception with regard to economic development leads to regional antagonism and 
cleavages. As a solution, I recommend that the Korean government and elected officials’ 
politically neutral intervention in the economy, regardless of regional preference, is 
necessary in order to reduce cultural and political regionalism. For example, in the 
budgetary process, government and elected officials should legitimately balance the budget, 
regardless of regional preference.  
Empirical evidence indicates that most people (89.7 percent) believe that 
politicians tend to favor one region over another and manipulate regional biases for their 
political gain. For example, political leaders in elections have more incentives to use 
regionalism for their political objectives, emphasizing political ideology. Regarding this 
concern, most people (79.3 percent) believe that this political regionalism is a barrier to 
reviving the nation’s democratic development. Regarding these concerns, I suggest some 
comments, such as recognizing regional voting as an outcome of regional nepotism or 
ideological conflicts, candidates should not shape regionalism into their political objectives. 
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Voters should carefully cast their votes for candidates or parties with consideration of 
candidates’ political capability or party platforms rather than with consideration of regional 
benefits. Additionally, government, especially the National Election Commission, should 
keep an eye on parities and candidates’ unlawful election campaigns stressing regional 
benefits, ideologies, and others.  
 
3. Limitations and Further Study 
Although this dissertation attempts to give some suggestions to both politicians and 
ordinary people for the health of Korean democracy, with regard to democratic process 
matters, there may be some limitations of this dissertation. The limitations include research 
method, data collection and lack of previous research. Further this dissertation examines a 
number of political explanations about the causes of the decline in confidence in 
government by looking at several types of democratic processes and diverse variables that 
can be causing ordinary people’s dissatisfaction with and distrust of government and 
politicians. This study makes room for further study. 
Survey research has its limits. As Nye and his colleagues (1997: 5) criticized, 
“responses in surveys vary with the phrasing and context of the questions that are asked.”  
For example, when respondents were asked for a preference for a democratic process with 
regard to political consideration and decision, most respondents preferred a pure direct 
democracy and only a few respondents supported a direct democracy. This deviated from 
my expectations. Furthermore, previous studies show that deliberative democracy is not 
only an important element of the democratic system, but is also used to reduce the people’s 
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distrust and discontent with the government. However, few of the respondents supported 
deliberative democracy in my study. Therefore, I should carefully create questions to 
measure the types of democratic process that people really want.  
Through the democratic process survey, we know that most people are dissatisfied 
with government and their democracy. And, we recognize that two factors, policy and the 
policy making process toward North Korea and regionalism, are significantly related to 
ordinary people’s negative views toward their government and democracy in South Korea. 
Moreover, empirical findings support the notion that ordinary people’s negative views 
toward their government and democracy are caused by the two factors related to types of 
democracy that they really prefer. Another important task for what political scientists have 
to do for successful democracy is to investigate how to practically and systematically solve 
the longstanding problems (e.g., North Korea policy and regionalism) and how to solve 
individuals’ negative attitude toward government and politicians in South Korea.  
To understand ordinary Koreans’ preference for types of democracy, respondents 
were asked about four types of democracy. And, to determine preferences for alternative 
types of democracy that people really want, respondents were asked about stealth 
democracy. Based on the two measurements, all respondents had to provide information 
regarding two different groups of democratic processes, regardless of the respondents’ 
primary type of democratic process. For example, a respondent who preferred direct 
democracy had to answer a measurement of stealth democracy even if he/she does not 
support stealth democracy. This measurement may be checked to obtain a more accurate 
result. Therefore, making a new construct is necessary for accurately measuring the types 
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of democratic processes that people really want. 
 
4. Final thought 
 The most important contributions of my dissertation is that it applied a theory of 
democracy to a nation that is in transition. Positive gains of South Korea in past have 
allowed us to take a complex look at democracy instead of examining it on simplistic level. 
Instead of just success or failure, I looked at democracy from the perspective of those 
experiencing it as citizens. Despite the dissatisfaction of citizens about their democracy, do 
not hate the government as a whole. The South Korean government can be a success and a 
disappointment at the same time. Only with asking the types of questions in this 
dissertation- what type of democracy do the people want and what role are they willing to 
play in that democracy-can democracy truly exist. In that right, I am helping to move the 
study of South Korean democracy onto more solid ground. Because people were willing to 
answer the questions of this study, there is hope that these important questions about 
democracy can be hopefully be moved in the public-if people will agree to discuss them.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2-1. People’s Trust in Political and Non-Political Organizations (Gallup Korea, 
2007) 
 
Government or 
Organization 
Percentage 
(100%) 
Government or 
Organization 
Percentage 
(100%) 
Military 62.7 Public Officials 38.8 
Media 60.3 President 34.7 
Civic 
Organizations 
58.4 Assembly Men 19.2 
Police 51.7 Parties 14.4 
Courts 51.3 Assembly 13.1 
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Figure 2-1. Categories of democratic procedures, with examples (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morese, 2002. p, 164) 
 
  Pre-decision Consideration by… 
  People Elites 
Decision by… People z Town hall meeting 
and juries 
z Navajo democracy 
z Ballot measures 
(initiatives and 
referenda) 
z Teledemocracy 
 Elites z Volunteer groups 
z Policy juries 
z Deliberative 
opinion polls 
z Standard 
representative 
government 
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Figure 2-2. Extended categories of democratic procedures (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morese, 2002. p, 239) 
 
  Pre-decision  Consideration by…  
  People Accountable but partially 
self-interested elites 
Objective but 
largely invisible 
and 
unaccountable 
elites 
Decision 
by… 
People z Town hall 
meeting and 
juries 
z Navajo 
democracy 
z Ballot measures 
(initiatives and 
referenda) 
z Teledemocracy 
_____ 
 Accountable 
but partially 
self-
interested 
elites 
z Volunteer 
groups 
z Policy juries 
z Deliberative 
opinion polls 
z Standard 
representative 
government 
 
____ 
 Objective 
but largely 
invisible and 
unaccountab
le elites 
____ ____ STEALTH 
DEMOCRACY 
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Table 2-2. Regional Split among Parties in Local District Seats 
Classification Uri Party GNP DLP MDP LDP Others
Seoul 42.8 41.3 3.4 9.8 0.7 2.0 
Pusan 38.9 52.5 2.9 0.8 0.3 4.6 
Daegu 26.7 62.4 2.5 1.8 0.5 6.1 
Incheon 44.7 38.9 7.4 5.2 0.6 3.2 
Kwangju 54.0 0.1 5.6 36.4 0.4 3.5 
Daejeon 45.8 22.4 1.5 3.3 22.1 4.9 
Ulsan 28.1 36.3 18.0 0.6 0.8 16.2 
Kyunggi 45.7 40.7 4.1 6.7 0.7 2.1 
Kangwon 38.8 43.3 4.2 6.4 0.2 7.1 
Northern 
Chungcheong 
50.5 32.6 3.3 1.0 9.2 3.4 
Southern 
Chungcheong 
38.9 15.8 2.2 3.6 33.7 5.8 
Northern Cholla 64.6 0.1 4.6 18.7 0.1 11.9 
Southern Cholla 46.9 0.8 2.6 38.4 0.6 10.7 
Northern Kyongsang 25.3 54.6 3.4 0.4 0.6 15.7 
Southern Kyongsang 34.4 47.7 8.4 0.6 0.6 8.3 
Cheju 49.4 40.2 3.4 3.8 0.6 2.6 
Source: National Election Commission in South Korea (/04/13/2005). 
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Table 4-1. Public attitudes toward the overall political system  
 Questions15 
Governmental 
Structure 
Public Policy Government 
Operation 
Political 
System 
Strongly agree 5.7% 
(34) 
 1.5% 
(9) 
3.8% 
(23) 
 1.0% 
(6) 
Agree  38.1% 
(228) 
 25.5% 
(153) 
 36.1% 
(216) 
 18.5% 
(111) 
Disagree  48.4% 
(290) 
 48.7% 
(292) 
 43.7% 
(262) 
 50.6% 
(303) 
Strongly 
disagree 
 7.8% 
(47) 
 24.2% 
(145) 
 16.4% 
(98) 
 29.9% 
(179) 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON
                                            
15 Governmental structure: Our basic governmental structures are the best and should not be changed in a 
major way. Public policy: I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced lately. 
Government operation: Our government would work best if it were run like a business. Political system: the 
current political system does a good job of representing the interests of all Koreans, regardless of 
socioeconomic status and gender.  
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Table 4-3. Prevalence of different types of democratic process 
Types of democratic process Number Percent of all respondents 
Pure direct democracy 344 57.4% 
Direct democracy 32 5.3% 
Deliberative democracy 156 26.0% 
Representative democracy 67 11.2% 
Total 599 100% 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON
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Table 4-6. Political participation and activities 
Political participation and activities Yes No Total 
 
Voting 
82.3% 
(493) 
17.7% 
(106) 
 100% 
(599) 
 
E-contacting (Internet usage) 
 24.9% 
(149) 
75.1% 
(450) 
 100% 
(599) 
 
Contacting 
 15% 
(90) 
 85% 
(509) 
 100% 
(599) 
 
Community action 
22.9% 
(137) 
 77.1% 
(462) 
 100% 
(599) 
 
Protest 
15.7% 
(94) 
84.3 
(505) 
 100% 
(599) 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
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Table 4-7. Binary Logistic analysis of different types of democratic process 
 
Variable PDD DLD RD 
Gender 
Age 
Policy toward N.K 
Sunshine Policy 
Process toward N.K 
Regionalism 
The government 
The local government 
The Constitutional Court 
The president 
The National Assembly 
Negative view of disagreement 
Political knowledge 
Attitudes toward government 1 
Attitudes toward government 2 
Attitudes toward government 3 
Attitudes toward government 4 
Voting 
E-contacting 
Contacting 
Community action 
Protest 
Education 
Income 
 
Constant 
Chi-square 
0.445** 
-0.014 
-0.074 
0.198 
0.255 
0.583** 
0.232 
0.019 
0.144 
-0.142 
-0.215 
0.433** 
0.122 
0.157 
-0.246 
-0.163 
-0.044 
-0.03 
0.527** 
0.566* 
-0.138 
-0.051 
0.04 
0.003 
 
-4.72*** 
61.44*** 
-0.2 
0.043 
-0.09 
0.278 
-0.38** 
0.38 
-0.017 
0.177 
-0.213 
-0.155 
0.186 
-0.3 
0.1 
-0.35** 
0.4** 
-0.1 
-0.12 
-0.23 
-0.666** 
-0.57* 
-0.1 
0.24 
-0.03 
0.01 
 
-0.162 
37.05** 
-0.6* 
0.09 
0.283 
-1.13** 
0.033 
-1.9*** 
-0.157 
-0.5 
0.02 
0.46 
0.08 
-0.49 
-0.05 
0.27 
-0.08 
0.17 
0.25 
-0.22 
0.05 
-0.06 
0.054 
-0.75 
-0.045 
-0.02 
 
7.0*** 
83.76*** 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
Note:  *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
 ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
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 * indicates statistical significance at the 0.1 level 
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Table 4-8. The public’s beliefs about debate and compromise 
 Elected officials should stop 
talking and take action 
Compromise is selling out 
one’s principles 
Strongly agree 37.9% 
(227) 
6.5% 
(39) 
Agree 52.4% 
(314) 
36.2% 
(217) 
Disagree 8.2% 
(49) 
49.9% 
(299) 
Strongly disagree 1.5% 
(9) 
7.3% 
(44) 
Strongly agree and 
agree 
90.3% 
(541) 
42.7% 
(256) 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
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Table 4-9. Public attitudes toward less democratic arrangements 
 Leave decisions to 
successful business 
people 
Leave decisions to 
nonelected experts 
Run government like 
a business 
Strongly agree 2.7% 
(16) 
6.5% 
(39) 
3.8% 
(23) 
Agree 28.7% 
(172) 
64.4% 
(386) 
36.1% 
(216) 
Disagree 51.9% 
(311) 
27.2% 
(163) 
43.7% 
(262) 
Strongly 
disagree 
16.7% 
(100) 
1.8% 
(11) 
16.4% 
(98) 
Strongly agree 
and agree 
31.4% 
(188) 
70.9% 
(425) 
39.9% 
(239) 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
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Table 4-10. Prevalence of stealth democratic characteristics 
Those with… Number Percent of all respondents 
No stealth democratic traits 21 3.5% 
One stealth democratic traits 97 16.2% 
Two stealth democratic traits 220 36.7% 
All three stealth democratic 
traits 
261 43.5% 
Total 599 100% 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
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Table 4-11. Preference for stealth democratic characteristics and types of 
democracy 
Types of 
democracy 
Prevalence of stealth democratic characteristics18  
 
0 1 2 3 Total 
PDD 2 
(0.6%) 
37 
(11%) 
128 
(37%) 
177 
(51%) 
344 
(100%) 
DD 2 
(6%) 
5 
(16%) 
14 
(43%) 
11 
(34%) 
32 
(100%) 
DLD 2 
(1%) 
41 
(26%) 
56 
(36%) 
57 
(37%) 
156 
(100%) 
RD 15 
(22%) 
14 
(21%) 
22 
(33%) 
16 
(24%) 
67 
(100%) 
Total 21 
(3%) 
97 
(16%) 
220 
(37%) 
261 
(44%) 
599 
(100%) 
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
                                            
18 0 indicates no stealth democratic traits, 1 indicates one stealth democratic traits, 2 indicates two stealth 
democratic traits, 3 indicates all three stealth democratic traits respectively.  
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Table 4-12. OLS analysis of stealth democratic beliefs 
 
Variable b s.e. p 
Types of democracy 
Gender 
Age 
Policy toward N.K 
Sunshine Policy 
Process toward N.K 
Regionalism 
The government 
The local government 
The Constitutional Court 
The president 
The National Assembly 
Negative view of disagreement 
Political knowledge 
Basic governmental structures 
Public policies 
Operating like business 
Political system 
Voting 
E-contacting 
Contacting 
Community action 
Protest 
Education 
Income 
 
 
Constant 
F 
Adj. R2 
-0.224 
0.071 
0.069 
-0.13 
0.24 
0.147 
0.163 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.078 
-0.014 
-0.035 
0.052 
0.014 
0.14 
0.108 
0.3 
0.008 
0.087 
0.16 
0.01 
-0.09 
0.034 
-0.014 
-0.015 
 
 
-.077 
6.9 
0.198 
0.036 
0.083 
0.037 
0.089 
0.115 
0.075 
0.098 
0.109 
0.11 
0.09 
0.091 
0.097 
0.077 
0.047 
0.058 
0.07 
0.06 
0.072 
0.1 
0.1 
0.12 
0.103 
0.12 
0.024 
0.029 
 
 
0.545 
0.00*** 
0.39 
0.06* 
0.15 
0.035** 
0.05** 
0.09** 
0.92 
0.79 
0.38 
0.87 
0.72 
0.5 
0.76 
0.014** 
0.12 
0.00*** 
0.91 
0.4 
0.1* 
0.92 
0.36 
0.77 
0.56 
0.6 
 
 
0.88 
0.00 
N 599   
Source: the democratic process survey. MBIZON 
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Note:  *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
 ** indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level 
 * indicates statistical significance at the 0.1 level 
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Appendix 
Questionnaires 
Different Types of Democracy 
1) If the Korean people carefully considered and discussed all political issues instead of 
relying on politicians to do this, the country would be a lot better off.  
1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___  3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___  
2) If the Korean people decided all political issues directly in operating their 
government instead of relying on politicians, the country would be a lot better off.  
1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___  3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
3) Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take 
action on important problems. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. 
Strongly Agree___  
4) What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles. 
1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___  
5) Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business 
people. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___  
6) Our government would run better if decision were left up to non-elected, independent 
experts rather than politicians or the people. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. 
Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___  
 
South Korea’s policy toward North Korea  
7) On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied with South Korea’s policy toward North Korea? 1. Not at all satisfied___ 2. 
Not very satisfied___ 3. Fairly satisfied___ 4. Very satisfied 
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8) Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with 
the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea? 1. Not at all satisfied___ 2. Not very 
satisfied___ 3. Fairly satisfied___ 4. Very satisfied 
9) When people criticize the Sunshine Policy, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable. 1. 
Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
10) The Sunshine Policy failed to bring about any meaningful changes in North Korean 
politics. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
11) When elected officials debate about North Korea, you feel uneasy, uncomfortable, 
and even angry. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly 
Agree___ 
12) There are too many compromises among politicians when discussing and debating 
the policy toward North Korea. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. 
Strongly Agree___ 
Regionalism 
13) On the whole, do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that 
regionalism is a barrier to reviving the nation’s democratic development and stable 
society. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
14) On the whole, do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that 
politicians tend to favor one region over another and manipulate regional biases for their 
political gain. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly 
Agree___ 
15) The GNP is more willing to work for the people living in Kyongsang provinces than 
the people living in Cholla provinces. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. 
Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
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16) The UDP is more willing to work for the people living in Cholla provinces than the 
people living in Kyongsang provinces. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. 
Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
17) When the GNP and the UDP debate on a certain issue, you feel uneasy and 
uncomfortable. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly 
Agree___ 
 
Approval of various parts of the government  
18) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way 
“the government” has been handling their job lately? 1. Strongly approve___ 2. 
Approve___ 3. Disapprove___ 4. Strongly disapprove 
19) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way 
“the local government” has been handling their job lately? 1. Strongly approve___ 2. 
Approve___ 3. Disapprove___ 4. Strongly disapprove 
20) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way 
“the Constitutional Court” has been handling their job lately? 1. Strongly approve___ 2. 
Approve___ 3. Disapprove___ 4. Strongly disapprove 
21) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way 
“the president” has been handling his/her job lately? 1. Strongly approve___ 2. 
Approve___ 3. Disapprove___ 4. Strongly disapprove 
22) Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the way 
“the National Assembly” has been handling their job lately? 1. Strongly approve___ 2. 
Approve___ 3. Disapprove___ 4. Strongly disapprove 
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Negative view of disagreement  
23) When people argue about political issues, you feel uneasy and uncomfortable. 1. 
Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
 
The political knowledge index  
24) What job or political office does Park Genu-hye now hold? 1. Former leader of the 
Grand National Party___ 2. I don’t know___  
25) What job or political office does Barack Obama now hold? 1. The President in the 
US___ 2. I don’t know___  
26) Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not? 1. the 
Constitutional Court___ 2. the President___ 3. the National Assembly___ 4. I don’t 
know___  
27) Which party currently has the most members in the National Assembly? 1.Grand 
National Party___ 2. I don’t know___ 
 
Attitudes toward government  
28) Our basic governmental structures are the best and should not be changed in a major 
way. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
29) I am generally satisfied with the public policies the government has produced lately. 
1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
30) Our government would work best if it were run like a business. 1. Strongly 
Disagree___ 2. Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
31) The current political system does a good job of representing the interests of all 
Koreans, regardless of socioeconomic status and gender. 1. Strongly Disagree___ 2. 
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Disagree___ 3. Agree___ 4. Strongly Agree___ 
 
Political participation  
32) Did you participate in the last presidential election on December 18, 2007 as an 
electorate?  
1. Yes___ 2. No___ 
33) Have you used the Internet (e.g., e-mail, UCC and blog) to try to inform or persuade 
other people about a political issue important to you in the past two years? 1. Yes___ 2. 
No___ 
34) Have you personally contacted a local or national government official about a need, 
problem or issue in the past two years? 1. Yes___ 2. No___ 
35) Have you worked with others in this community to try to solve some community 
problems in past two years? 1. Yes___ 2. No___ 
36) Have you participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches in the 
past two years? 1. Yes___ 2. No___ 
 
37). Some people say what we need in this country is for ordinary people like you and 
me to decide for ourselves what needs to be done and how. Others say ordinary people 
should instead allow elected officials to make all political decisions. Still others say a 
combination would be best. 
1. ___ 2. ___ 3. ___ 4. ___ 5. ___ 6. ___  
38) Some people say what we need in this country is for ordinary people like you and 
me to discuss and debate for ourselves what needs to be done and how. Others say 
ordinary people should instead allow elected officials to discuss and debate all political 
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issues. Still others say a combination would be best. 
1. ___ 2. ___ 3. ___ 4. ___ 5. ___ 6. ___  
Age 
___  
Gender 
0. Male___  1. Female___ 
 
Region  
1. Seoul and Kyung-Gi province___ 2. Choong-Chung province___ 3. Kang-Won 
Province___ 4. Cholla province___ 5. Kyongsang province___  6. Je-ju province___ 
Education 
1. Less than high school___ 2. Some high school___ 3. High school graduate___ 4. 
Some technical school___ 5. Technical school graduate___ 6. Some college___ 7. 
College graduate 8. Post graduate or professional degree___ 
Income 
Could you estimate your family income in 2008, before taxes? 
1 = less than 20,000,000 Won, 2 = 20,000,000 to less than 35,000,000 Won, 3 = 
35,000,000 to less than 50,000,000 Won, 4 = 50,000,000 to less than 65,000,000 Won, 5 
= 65,000,000 to less than 80,000,000 Won, 6 = over 80,000,000 Won. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
